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Where, however, the action by the seller against the buyer is not
on the price of the goods, but on the security given for them, as
for instance a note or bill given in payment, it would seem that,
according to the English rule, the purchaser has no defence, even
pro tanto, where the goods are warranted of a particular description, and turn out to be of an inferior description ; though he may
defend the action in toto if the consideration has totally failed,
provided that he has repudiated the contract; the reason being that
the instrument is in its nature new, and the remedy is therefore by
cross action: 1 Chitty on Contracts, 11 Am. ed., at page 653; and
in such cases it may be that it is not necessary to show a return,
that is where the failure of consideration is total: Burton v.
Stewart, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 236 ; Perley v. Blach, 23 Pick. (Mass.)
283. In the United States, however, it has been held that in a
suit by the payee of a note given for the price of a chattel, it is
competent for the maker to prove in reduction of damages, that the
sale was effected by means of false representations on the part of
the payee, without a return of the goods sold : see 1arrington v.
Stratton, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 510; -Perley v. Baleh, 23 Id. 283,
Burton v. Stewart, 3 Wend. 236; Coburn v. Ware, 30 Me. 203;
Raspberry v. Moye, 23 Miss. 320 ; -Albertson v. Hfolloway, 16 Ga.
377; 1 Chitty, wzra, notes.
ARTHUR BIDDL..
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UNION MANUFACTURING CO. v. MORRISSEY.
AT., while using a machine in his capacity of workman for a manufacturing corn-'
pany, acquired a knowledge of its defects and consequent unsafe condition. He
complained of its condition to the foreman, under whose orders he was working,
and whose duty it was to see that the machinery was kept in good order and repair.
The foreman promised him to remedy said defects, and directed him to go to work on
the machine. The workman thereupon remainedin the service of the company, and
continued to use the machine and, in so doing, was injured through its said defects
before any.steps were taken to remedy the same.
Held, That the workman's knowledge of'the defects in the machine was not, under
the circumstances and as a matter of law, conclusive of contributory negligence on
his part ; but it was a fact in the case to be taken into consideration by the jury,
with all the other facts and cricumstances, in determining the question, whether the
workman's own negligence contributed to the accident by which he was injured.
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ERROR to the District Court of Lucas county.

Patrick Morrissey, defendant in error, commenced an action in
the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas county, against the Union
Manufacturing Company, plaintiff in error, for damages alleged to
have been sustained by him while in the service of the company,
through the company's negligence in furnishing him hazardous and
unsafe machinery to use, and placing over him an incompetent
foreman.
The company was, in the year 1878, and had been some time
before, engaged in manufacturing wood pails. Morrissey was injured
by having a portion of his hand cut off while he was at work upon
a machine known as a "pail-lathe," which was composed in part of
a circular saw, a jointer, and a bed or carriage commonly called a
"bunk"-all used in the several operations necessary to make a
pail, such as cutting off the staves -to equal lengths, jointing them,
turning out the inside, turning off 'the outside, etc.
One Tivnan was the foreman of the room in which Morrissey
was at work when injured, and as such had charge of all the men
and machinery in the room. It was the foreman's duty to manage
and control the men and see that the machinery was kept in good
order and condition.
On the morning of the injury, the foreman directed Morrissey, who
had for sixteen months been at work under him on the lathe, to go
to work on the part known as the " jointer." He had worked on
the jointer before this time for about six months. The jointer was
in bad condition, and Morrissey called the foreman's attention to it,
saying in reference to what is known as the bunk, "there ought to
be something done with that." The foreman replied, "you joint a
few staves, get out some staves to keep these fellows going, and I
will take it up stairs and get it fixed." Morrissey thereupon commenced jointing, and shortly after, by reason of the defect in the
bunk, his hand was forced against the saw teeth and he was hurt as
stated in his petition. About two weeks before he was injured, he
heard the foreman say to one of the workmen, named Fuller, who
had called his attention to the bunk's need of repair, "I want you
to keep on working until we get a lay off, and I will get it fixed."
In the Court of Common Pleas, the testimony tending to show the
negligence of the company, and all the facts of the case having
been given to the jury, the court, upon the motion of the defendant,
took the consideration of the case from the jury, and directed a
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verdict for the defendant, charging that it was "a question entirely
of law," and that Morrissey "had been guilty of gross negligence
in using dangerous machinery when it was out of order," "although,"
as the court further charged, "there was no dispute but that the
defendant was guilty of gross negligence."
Mforrissey, by his counsel, excepted, filed motion for a new trial,
and upon judgment for defendant being rendered, took bill of exceptions, embodying in it all the testimony and charge of the court, and
filed petition in error in the District Court, where the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas was reversed, and the cause remanded
for a new trial.
The case is here on petition to reverse the judgment of the Dis:
trict Court.
TV. A. Collins and Geo. B. gaynes, for plaintiff in error.
Pratt& Wilson, for defendant in error.
DICKiAN, J.-There is no evidence that there was any carelessness on the part of Morrissey, the defendant in error, iii his mode
of operating the machine through whose defects he was injured. On
the morning of his injury-from the time of his commencing work up
to and at the time he was injured-he ran the machine much slower
than usual, on account of its bad condition, and in order to avoid
being hurt. The contributory negligence imputed to him, consisted
in his knowing that the part called the "jointer" was out of repair,
and could not be safely used, and in thereafter remaining in the
service of the company and continuing to operate that portion of
the machine. For that reason the court below took the case from
the jury and directed a verdict for the company. The question of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is generally a
mixed question of law and fact; but, it is only when the facts are
beyond dispute and admit of no rational inference but that of.
negligence, that the court has the right to apply the law without the
aid of a jury. The defendant in error, while in the employment
of the company, was under the supervision and direction of a
foreman, whose duty it was to manage and control the workmen, and
see that the machinery was kept in good order and repair. As
soon as Morrissey discovered that the part of the machinery upon
which he was working was in a condition unsuitable for use, he
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complained of the same to the foreman, who promised him that the
defects in the machine should be remedied, and ordered him to
continue at his work. He thereupon began work at once at the
jointer, and in a short time thereafter was injured through its
defects, before any steps were taken to remedy them. As a fact
which was taken to be beyond dispute, the court charged the jury
that the company was guilty of gross negligence. But the court, in
view of another fact beyond dispute viz., that Morrissey worked at
the machine with'knowledge of its defective condition, evidently
considered it a settled principle that such knowledge was, as matter
of law, conclusive of contributory negligence on his part; and
ignored the imporfance of other material questions of fact not
beyond dispute, which might tend to qualify or limit the legal effect
of such knowledge, and which should have been submitted by the
court to the consideration of the jury. After the promise made to
Morrissey himself by the foreman that the jointer should be "fixed,"
and after hearing the foreman promise the same thing two weeks
before to another workman, it became a material question of fact for
the jurr to determine, under proper instructions from the court,
whether Moirissey, after acquiring such knowledge, continued such a
length of time in the service of the company as to constitute a waiver
on his part of the defects in the machine. Whether he afterwards
remained in the employment of the company because of his reliance
on the promise of the foreman to put the jointer in repair, and
whether the jointer was out of repair to such an extent that a man
of ordinary care would not continue to use it, even after a promise
to put it in good repair, were also questions of fact which should
have been left to the determination of the jury, under proper
instructions from the court. But it could not, in order to take the
case from the jury, that the knowledge alone of the defects in the
machinery, and continuing to use the same, as matter of law,
admitted of no rational inference but that of negligence, where
such knowledge is taken in connection with the fact that Morrissey
complained to the foreman of the defects, and received from him
a promise that they should be remedied.
The court below applied the doctrine in all its latitude, without
any qualifications in the light of other facts and circumstances of
the case, that if one knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to
danger by using dangerous machinery, he can not be said to be
without any fault or negligence on his part, and therefore can not
VOL. XXXI°-,
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recover for injuries suffered by him in consequence. That a
knowledge of the unsafe condition of the machinery used is a
most important element in determining the question of contributory
negligence there can be no doubt. Alone and unexplained, it may,
under some circumstances, be conclusive that the injured party was
willing to assume the attendant risks, and waive all objections to the
defects that rendered the machinery hazardous. But such knowledge
on the part of one induced to remain in the service of an employer
by a promise to remove the cause of danger, is not of itself, in point of
law, an answer sufficient to exonerate a defendant who has omitted
to supply machinery that is safe and proper. Relying upon such
inducement held out by their employers, the most prudent workmen will often take risks, not merely on account of their own
necessities, but in consideration of their employers, whose interests
require their continued service. Under such circumstances the
weight of authority is in accord with the language of WILLES, J , in
HMolmes v. Worthington, 2 Foster & Fin. 533. "If the defendant
knew of the defect and undertook to repair it, and the plaintiff went
on working, relying on their repairing it, then they were liable.
If the plaintiff complained of the defect, and the defendant
promised that it should be remedied, he is not to be deprived of his
remedy merely because, relying on their promise, he remained in
their employment."
To the same effect was the judgment in Oiarke v. Holmes, 7 H.
& N. 937, in the Exchequer Chamber, on appeal from the decision
of the Court of Exchequer. In that case the plaintiff was employed
by the defendant to oil dangerous machinery. At the time the
plaintiff entered upon the service, the machinery was fenced, but
the fencing became broken by accident. The plaintiff complained
of the dangerous state of the machinery, and the defendant promised
him that the fencing should be restored.. The plaintiff, without
any negligence on his part, was severely injured in consequence
of the machinery remaining, unfenced.
It was held in the
Exchequer Chamber-affirming the judgment of the Court of
Exchequer-that the defendant was liable for the injury. Chief
Justice COOKBURN, in delivering his opinion, very forcibly drew a
distinction between the case of an employee who knowingly enters
into an engagement to work on defective machinery, and that of
him who in the course of his employment discovers its defective
condition, but is induced to remain in the same service by the
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master promising him to remedy the defect. If the master in such
a case fails to fulfil his obligation, the employee cannot be held to
have waived his right to hold the master responsible.
The rule recognised in the English courts has been followed by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of
H.ough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S.213. In that case the engineer
had a knowledge of a defect in the engine, and complained thereof
to both the master mechanic and the foreman of the round house.
They promised that it should be promptly remedied. But the
court below seemed to attach no consequence, to the engineer's complaint, or the promise made to him. Under the instructions given,
if the engineer worked the engine with knowledge of its defect, the
jury were to find for the company, although he may have been justified in relying upon the promise made to him that the defect should
be remedied. The instruction in that branch of the case, involving
the question of contributory negligence on the part of the engineer,
was considered by the supreme court misleading and erroneous.
Justice HARLAN cites approvingly the language of Mr. Cooley in his
work on Torts: "If the servant, having a right to abandon the service because it is dangerous, refrains from doing so in .consideration
of assurances that the danger shall be removed, the duty to remove
the danger is manifest and imperative, and the master is not in the
exercise of ordinary care unless or until he makes his assurances
good. Moreover, the assurances remove all ground for the argument
that the servant by continuing in the employment engages to
assume the risk."
In view of the whole current of authority, and in the light of
reason, we are led to the conclusion that under the circumstances
of the case at bar Morrissey's knowledge of the defective state of
the machine which he was using and continued to use, was not, as
matter of law, conclusive of contributory negligence on his part.
Such knowledge, however, was a prominent fact in the case, to
be taken into consideration by the jury in connection with all
the other facts and circumstances, in determining the question
whether his own negligence contributed to the accident by which
he was injured.
The judgment of the district court must be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
The question involved in this case is:
will the promise of the master or his fore-

man to repair defective machinery exoncrate a servant from contributory uegli-
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gence, should he continue to work with
such defective machinery after having a
knowledge of the defects ? and the court
held that it was a question for the jury,
(1) whether the servant continued to
work the defective machinery such a
length of time, after knowing its defects,
as to constitute a waiver on his part
of the defects in the machinery; (2)
whether the servant continued in the
work with the defective machine because
of the reliance upon the promise to repair ; (3) whether the defects were such
that a man of ordinary care would not
continue to use it after the promise to
renatrL.
The question is divisible; first, what
knowledge of a defect by the servant will
amount to contributory negligence ; second, what will prevent this knowledge
from amounting to contributory negligence. Both the servant and the master
must use ordinary care, and while each
discharge this duty no liability exists for
injuries resulting to the one or the othernot to the servant because the master, by
the exercise of ordinary care, did not
know and could not have known of the
defect or danger, hence the injury was
unavoidable; and not to the master for
the same reason. But if either fail in
the exercise of ordinary care, even in the
slightest degree, and injury results therefrom he who was guilty of this failure or
carelessness is'liable, and the question is
to whose act shall the blame be imputed,
and whose act was the proximate cause
of the injury.
Defects or dangers may be known or
unknown to the servant or to the master
or to both. If known, and injury results,
such knowledge does not make the failure
to avoid the accident negligence per se,
but this is for the jury to determine ;
and if unknown, and there is no want of
ordinary care, there is no liability.
Hence a servant knowing that there is
a defect in the machinery, that it is not
in good condition or repair, is not guilty
of negligence by continuing to use such
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defective machinery, if in the exercise of
ordinary care (or as some courts state,
the servant is not guilty of negligence
unless the danger is palpable, plain and
obvious), because (1) the master may
have'promised to repair the defect; (2)
he may have had reason to believe that
the danger or risk had been removed or
lessened ; (3) having the knowledge of
the defect he exercised the care commensurate with the risk which was still insufficient ; (4) the particular act was called
for by the exigencies of the service; (5)
knowing the defect he did not know the
risk or danger, such as where the master
lulled the servant into a sense of security
by insisting there was no danger; (6)
the danger or risk was not obvious, plain
or palpable, bat the defect was latent ;
(7) the servant incurred the risk by
direction of the master, the same not being a necessary result of the service or
palpable and obvious. In all such cases
the question is for the jury to determine
whether any of these excuses exist, and
if any exist whether the same exonerates
the servant from contributory negligence:
Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & N. 949;
Greenleafv. Railroad Co., 29 Iowa 14;
Pattersonv. Railroad Co., 76 Penn. St.
318; Snow v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen
( Mass.) 441 ; iluddleston v. Lowell MIac/ine Shop, 106 Mass. 282; Reedy. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94; Wiittaler v. Boyiston, 97 Mass. 273; Coombs v. Cordage
Co., 102 Id. 572 ; Caning Y. Railroad
Co., 49 N. Y. 521 ; Tarrant v. Webb,
18 C. B. 797 ; Kray v. Railroad Co., 32
Iowa 357 ; Ford v. .ytchburg Railroad
Co., 110 Mass. 240 ; like v. Railroad
Co., 53 N. Y. 549 ; Couch v. Steel, 3 E.
& B. 402 ; Greenleafv. Dubuque Railroad
Co., 33 Iowa 52 ; Maldoumey v. Railroad, 39 Id. 615 ; Way v. Illinois Railroad Co., 40 Id. 341 ; Lundey v. Caswell, 47 Id. 159 ; Crutchfieldv. Richmond
Railroad Co., 78 N. C. 300; Jones v.
Roach, 9 Jones & Sp. 248 ; Conroy v.
Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35 ; Kellj
v. Spring Co., 7 Rep. 60.
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At first the rule was that continuance
in the service after objection to defects
was considered conclusive against the
servant, on the ground that he knowingly
incurred the risk and waived the defect.
See Railroad Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St.
541 ; Wright v. Railroad Co., 25 N. Y.
562; Hoey v. Dublin Railroad Co., Irish
Rep., 5 C. L. 206 ; Clarke v. Holmes, 7
Hurl. & N. 937 ; Paterson v. Wallace,
I MIacq. H. L. 748 ; Shear. & Red. on
Neg. 96; but subsequently it was ruled
(Clarke v. Holmes, supra; Holmes v. Wyortldngton, 2 F. & F. 533,) that the question
involved, whether or not the servant
waived his objection to the defect, was one
governed by facts afd circumstances and
should be determined by the jury; for
the reasons that the servant had aWright
to complete his contract if he had not
waived the defects, inasmuch as he could
assert his rights to the contract, and that
any kind of notice of the defect by the
servant would be sufficient.
Mr. Wharton, in his work on Negligence, says, that' a servant does not,
by remaining in his master's employ,
with knowledge of defects in machinery
he is obliged to use, assume the risk attendant upon the use of such machinery,
if he has notified the employer of such
defects, or protested against them in such
a way as to induce a confidence that they
will be remedied," and he cites the following cases : Kroy v. Railroad Co., 32
Iowa 357; Greenleaf v. Railroad Co.,
29 Id. 14; Snow v. Railroad Co., 8
Allen 411, in support of his position. In
the first two cases there was no claim or
pretence that the master had been notified,
and in the other case the decision did not
rest upon this question. The question
involved in such cases is whether the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence in performing the service after knowledge of
defect. That he complained of the defect
has nothing to do with the question :
Ford v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 110
Mass. 240; Snow v. Railroad Co., supra; Pattersonv. RailroadCo., 76 Penn.
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St. 389. It depends upon the promise to
repair. If the master promises to repair
the defect, such promise rebuts the presumption that the servant assumed the
risk notwithstanding the defect, and hence
if injury results to the servant in consequence of the defect, whilst exercising
ordinary care, the master is liable because
it is his negligence in not making the
repair as he promised. Even if the promise has been made the servant must use
ordinary care, because in all the cases
the right to recover depended upon the
question whether the danger was so obvious and inevitable that gross negligence
was fairly imputable to the servant in
remaining. The promise to repair removes from the servant the burden of
establishing due care on his part and imposes it upon the master, and this is the
case however long the servant continues
in the service thereafter, even though the
master fails to repair, because until the
defect becomes such that no person with
ordinary care would incur the risk, the
servant has a right to rely upon the master's promise to repair; although it has
been held that if, after the expiration of
a reasonable time for the repair, the servant sees that the defect complained of
has not been remedied, and he nevertheless continues in the service, he is deemed
to have accepted the risks of the danger,
and the master's liability ceases : BElair
v. Chicago Railroad Co., 43 Iowa 662;
Crutchfield v. Railroad Co., 78 N. C.
300 ; and see Shanny v. Androscoggin
mills, 66 Maine 420, 427; Holmes v.
tWorthington, 2 Fost. & Fin. 533. This
cannot be correct, because the danger and
defect may be as great as the time of the
promise as at the expiration of the reasonable time, and as long as the servant
uses ordinary care in using the defective
machinery and the same is not more dangerous than at the time the promise to repair was made; the servanthas a right to
rely upon the master's promise to repair;
and because the rule governing liability
of this character is that the servant is not
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guilty of negligence unless the defect is so
glaring that with the utmost care and skill
the danger is still imminent, so that none
but a reckless man would incur it, then
if the servant will engage in it he does it
at his peril; but if the machinery or appliances, though dangerous, are of such a
character that they can be reasonably
used by the exercise of skill and ordinary
care incident to the situation he does not
assume the risk: Patterson v. Railroad
Co., 76 Penn. St. 389 ; Buzzell V. Laconia Co., 48 Me. 113; ByLs, J., in
Clarke v. Holmes, ante; Conroy v. Iron
Works, 62 Mo. 35; Stoddardv. Railroad
Co., 65 Id. 514; Keegan v. Kavanaugh,
62 Id. 232; Seclaire v. Railroad Co. 20
Minn. 9, 19 ; Soith vP Railroad Cc , 61
Mo, 591 ; Britton v. Western, 4v., Co.,
L. R., 7 Exch. 130 ; Pattersonv. Wallace, I Macq. H. L. (as. 748 ; Dale v.
Railroad Co., 63 Mo. 455; Dorsey v.
Cons. Co., 42 Wis. 583. But see Davitt
v. Railroad Co., 50 Mio. 302 ; Baylor v.
Railroad Co., 40 N. J. L. 23; Owen v.
Railroad Co., 1 Lans. 198; McGlynn
v. Bradie, 31 Cal. 376 ; Riley v. Baxendale, 6 Hurl. & N. 244.
The question is, when is the causal connection between the employer's negligence and the injury broken, by any
intervening negligence on the part of the
employee. Is it on the expiration of a
reasonable time to repair the defect, or at
the time the defect becomes so plain that
a person of ordinary care would not assume the risk in continuing to work the
defective machinery. Reason and analogy is in favor of the latter. The rule
that the promise of the master to repair
exonerates the servant from negligence
in continuing to work defective machinery was first advanced in Clarke v.
Holmes, 7 Hurlst. & N. 942, in which
the servant, knowing the danger, complained that to prevent it the fence enclosing dangerous machinery should be
restored, which was promised to be done
by the master, and in consequence of the
master's failure to fulfil his promise, the

servant some time after the promise,
whilst acting within the scope of his employment, was seriously injured. The
jury found that the servant was not
guilty of negligence in performing his
duties or in remaining in the employment
after the promise to repair, but that the
master was guilty of negligence and liable for not repairing or rebuilding the
fence. The court held that the facts of
this case were proper for the jury and
refused to disturb the verdict, and stated
that there is a distinction between a case
where a servant knowingly enters into a
contract to work defective machinery,
and that of one who, on a temporary defect arising, is induced by the master to
continue at the labor under the promise
that te defect should be remedied. In
the former case the master is not liable,
and in the latter he is, unless the defect
is such that no person of ordinary pradeuce would run the hazard of working
it, and both cases are for the jury to
determine.
In another case, Critchton v. Keir, 1
Macph. 407, it was held that a promise
by the master that the defect shall be remedied will not relieve the servant from
the charge of contributory negligence.
In Holmes v. Worthington, 2 F. & F.
533, the court followed Clarke v. Holmes,
and held that although machinery becomes dangerous, yet, if the servant complains of it to the master and continues
to use it, with a reasonable expectation
that it will be repaired, and an accident
happens through its defective condition,
he is not, by his knowledge of such defects, precluded from a recovery, but that
the question is for the jury whether or
not lie was guilty of contributory negligence. And in a case (Smith v. Dowell,
3 F. & F. 238), immediately after this, it
was held that where work was being carried on which in part was dangerous and
unsafe because of the lack of certain
precautions, which precautions the master promised to adopt, but before doing so
he left, directing the work to go on
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notwithstanding the want of the precautions, and a servant was injured thereby,
the servant could not recover, because it
was negligence on his part to pursue his
employment, knowing the danger, until
the precautions were taken.
In Laning v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y.
521, a competent foredian was hired for
certain work. Afterwards he became intemperate, and whilst intoxicated caused
defective scaffolding to be erected. The
scaffolding fell and injured the plaintiff.
Whilst the question of the master's liability, after promise to repair, was not involved, the court stated that if a servant is
induced to remain in the service, by the
master's promise to repair, the fact of remaining in the service, after knowledge of
the defect under such promise, is not negligenceper se, but is a question for the jury.
In Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62
Mo. 35, the plaintiff was injured by insecurely fastened boards on a tramway,
the insecurity of which he knew three
days before the injury, and which he reported to the master, who promised to
repair but "could not do everything at
once," and the court held that the question whether the servant was guilty of
negligence in remaining after the knowledge of the defect and a promise to repair, was for the jury, and that after a
promise to repair a servant is not guilty
of negligence unless the defect is such
that a man with common prudence would
not use the machine.
In Patterson v. P. 4- C. Railroad Co.,
76 Penn. St. 389, the plaintiff, a conductor, was forced from a car which ran off
the track because of the shortness of a
siding curve and connections, a defect
known to the conductor, who previously
notified the superintendent and foreman
from whom he received a promise to repair, and the court held that the servant
was not guilty of negligence.
In Crutchfield v. Railroad Co., 78 N.
C. 302, the court, whilst acceding to the
above position, also held that if the servant has notified the employer of the de-

feet, so that it may be remedied within
a reasonable time, and after such reasonable time he sees that the defects have
not been remedied and yet continues to
expose himself, the employer is not liable. This modification of the rule limiting the .liability to reasonable time has
no authority to support it, but it would
be consistent to assert that if the servant
knew or could have known, or a man of
ordinary care and prudence would have
known, that themaster would not repair,
then he assumed the risk of the defect.
See Soonan v. Brockway, 3 Rob. 74 ; 28
How. Pr. 472 ; Railroad Co. v. Jewell,
46 IlL. 99.
In Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S.
215, the engineer knew of the defective
cow-cat.'her and pilot, and informed the
master mechanic and foreman, who promised repair, which was not done. The
Supreme Court held that the subsequent
use of defective machinery, in the belief, under a promise to repair, that it
will be put in proper condition within a
reasonable time, does not make the servant guilty of negligence, it being a
question for the jury to determine whether he used due care.
A learned author (Mook's Underhill on Torts, p. 61,) asserts that if
the master promised to repair the defect, or induced the servant to remain, the
mere fact of the servant continuing in
the employment does not of itself, as a
matter of law, exonerate the mhster from
liability, but the question of contributory
negligence is one for the jury. See, also,
Chicago v. Platt, 89 Ill. 141 ; Stevenson
v. Jewett, 17 Hun 210; Patterson v.
Railroad Co., 76 Penn. St. 287, contra;
Assop v. Yates, 2 H. & N. 768; Griffiths v. Gidlow, 3 Id. 648.
Another author (Sh. & Red. on Neg.,
sect. 96) states that where the master has
expressly promised to repair a defect, the
servant can recover for an injury caused
thereby, within such a period of time
after the promise as it would be reasonable to allow for its performance, or
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within any period which would not preclude all reasonable expectation that the
promise might be kept, and it is for the
jury to say whether the defect was such
that none but a reckless servant, utterly
careless of his safety, would have used
the defective machinery. If, under all
the circumstances and in view of the
promise, the servant is not wanting in
due care in continuing to use the defective machinery, then the master is liable,
because the servant may rely upon the
promise to repair, and the master is responsible for the consequences that may
be reasonably expected to result under
ordinary circumstances from his misconduct: citing Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Exch.

243; roey v. Felton, 11 C. B. N. S.
143; Senior v. Ward, 1 E. & E. 385.
Another author (Cooley on Torts),
after stating this rule, states that after
making the promise to repair the duty
of the master is manifest and imperative that he must remove the danger,
and he is not in the exercise of ordinary
care unless and until he makes his promise good, and the promise removes all
ground for the argument that the servant
by continuing in the employment engages
to assume its risks, the implication being
rebutted by the promise to repair.
See
RailroadCo. v. Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 133.
JorN F. KELLY.
Bellaire, Ohio.

[The question how far the master's liabilityis affe:ted by the fact that the failure to
remedy the defect in the machinery was due to the negligence of a co-employee has
been discussed in several recent cases. SeeWilson v. Merry, L. R., I Sc. & D. Ap.
0. 326 ; Holden v. .tchburg Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 268 ; 2 Am. and Eng. R. R.
Cases 94, and note; Davisv. RailroadCo. to appear in 55 Vt. 84 ; and Mulvey v.
R. L Locomotive Works, to appear in 14 R. I. 52. Abstracts of the last two cases
will be found at the end of this number.-ED.]
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The power to erect wharves and charge wharfage is not one of the implied
powers of a municipality, but requires for its exercise an express legislative grant.
Such power is not deducible from an authority to regulate streets, lanes and
alleys, and to make laws and regulations for the good order and government of the
municipality.
Where a municipal corporation is a riparian proprietor it may charge wharfage,
but not if the wharf extends beyond low-water line, and is principally constructed
on the line of a public street.

IN Admiralty-Libel for wharfage.
J. H. Nevin, for libellant.
.D. T. Watson, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The borough of Elizabeth claims the right to
charge wharfage-First, under legislative authority; and, secondly,
by virtue of riparian proprietorship. Let us briefly examine the
grounds of the claim in the order stated.
ACIHESON,
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1. It is not pretended that the borough charter -confers any
express authority to construct a wharf and exact tolls or wharfage
for its use. Implied authority is all that is asserted, and this must
be derived either from the powers granted in respect to highways or
the general power to enact laws for the government of the borough.
The original act of incorporation authorized the town council to
appoint officers for "regulating the streets, lanes and alleys," and
by the act of 1851 the borough authorities are empowered "to
survey, lay out, enact and ordain such roads, streets, lanes, alleys,
courts and common sewers as they may deem necessary; and to regulate the roads, streets, lanes, alleys, courts, common sewers, public
squares, common grounds, footwalks, pavements, gutters, culverts
and drains, and the heights, grades, widths, slopes and forms thereof;
and they shall have all other needful jurisdiction over the same."
Under a substantially similar grant of power the Supreme Court
of Indiana, in Snyder v. 1?ockport, 6 Ind. 237, held that the
municipality was not authorized to construct a wharf. But if it
be conceded that the borough of Elizabeth might lawfully construct
a wharf at the river terminus of a street, it by no means follows
that tle borough can charge wharfage for its use, any more than it
can exact tolls for the use of any other public highway.
In respect to municipal affairs generally, the council is'empowered to make "laws, ordinances, by-laws and regulations" for the
good order and government of the borough, subject to the express
restriction that they shall not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with,
the laws of the Commonwealth.
The question first to be decided is whether, from the express
powers above recited, the borough of Elizabeth can rightfully deduce
a legislative grant of the franchise to charge wharfage. In his
work on Municipal Corporations, § 67, (2d ed.,) Mr. Dillon classes
the huthority to erect wharves and charge wharfage among "the
powers of a special and extra-municipal nature." In this view he is
.fully sustained by the adjudged cases: The Wharf Case, 3 Bland.
Ch. 361; People v. Broadway Wharf Co., 31 Cal. 33. It was
declared in the Wharf Case, supra, 384, that, except by express
legislative allowance, the "public wharves [of Baltimore] are no
more liable to wharfage than any one of the streets of the city are
subject to toll." In the case of The Efmpire State, 1 Newb. Adm.
541, it was held that while the authorities of the city of Detroit
might erect wharves at the termini o'f their streets, suitable for
Vor,. XXX -74
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landings, such erections became free to the public- as extensions of
the streets, and the city had no authority to exact toll for ingress or
egress. In St. Martinsville v. The Mary Lewis, 32 La. Ann.
1293-95, the court decide against the right of the municipality to
erect wharves and charge wharfage, and say: 11The power to exact
tolls is a restraint upon the freedom of navigation, and is liable to
abuse; and the corporation seeking to enforce such exaction must
present a clear legislative authority for the purpose."
This precise question, so far as I know, has never been considered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; but in Hfuntington, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Brown, 2 P. & W. 462, 464, that
court, treating of the subject of tolls collectible by a turnpike company, after declaring turnpike roads to be public highways, say:
"And it is the franchise of the citizen to use them free of every
restriction that is not explicitly imposed by the legislature."'
In Perrine v. Chesapeake &' D. Canal Co., 9 How. 172, the
Supreme Court of the United States applied the same doctrine to a
canal built by an incorporated company. The principle is undoubtedly applicable to a public wharf, for when a highway upon the land
connects with a public river, to pass from the one highway to the
other is a public common right: Fowler v. MJott, 19 Barb. 204.
That it is competent for the legislature of a state to authorize a
municipal corporation to demand tolls from those engaged in commerce for the use of a public wharf is settled; but the privilege
being in derogation of common right, the municipality claiming it
must show a plain legislative grant of the franchise. I am of
opinion that the borough of Elizabeth has not been invested by the
legislature with such authority.
2. But where a municipal corporation is a riparian proprietor,
its right to charge wharfage has been judicially recognised, 11furphy v. City of Montgomery, 11 Ala. 586-589; Dillon, Mun. Corp.
§ 72; Cannonv. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577. The second inquiry,
therefore, is whether upon this ground the claim of the borough can.
be sustained.
The wharf at Elizabeth was constructed by the borough in 1847
or 1848, and the cost defrayed, in part, out of borough funds, and
in part by private subscriptions'. It is located at the foot or mouth
of Market street, which street, the evidence shows, extends to the
Monongahela river. Mr. Diehl, who was a member of the town
council when the wharf was' built, and chairman of the construction
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committee, testifies that Market street at this place is 60 feet in
width. He also states that at the river bluff the wharf is about 60
feet wide, and at low-water line it is from 80 to 100 feet in width.
The wharf is constructed on Market street, a public highway, and on
ground on either side, which the Messrs. Walker claimed, and which
they agreed the borough might take for the wharf. These strips
of ground so given by the Walkers, respectively, cannot exceed 20
feet in width, and probably are considerably less. They were a
contribution to the wharf by the Walkers in lieu of a money subscription. If they ever executed a deed to the borough it has not
been produced, or its contents proved. In this connection it is but
proper to state that there is evidence that before the construction
of the wharf all the ground within its lines was freely used by the
public. It is further shown that along its entire water front the
wharf extends out into the river at least from 10 to 15 feet beyond
the low-water line.
From the established facts my conclusion is that the claim of the
borough to wharfage, based on its alleged riparian ownership, cannot be maintained. The only part of the land embraced in the
wharf, to which the borough can assert any sort of title, is the two
narrow strips on either side of Market street donated by the Walkers.
But, under the proofs, that transaction looks to me like a simple
dedication of the ground by the Walkers to the public for the purpose of a wharf. But if not, and the borough is invested with the
ownership, this fact, it seems to me, is insufficient to sustain the
claim of the borough, for several reasons: First, it is the settled law of Pennsylvania that on navigable streams, such as the
Monongahela river, the title of the riparian owner extends only to
the ordinary low-water line: Iainwrigit v. Me Cullough, 60 Penn.
St. 66; Poor v. .e6lure, 77 Id. 214. The title to the bed of the
river is in the Commonwealth for the use of the whole community,
(Id.,)and the riparian owner has no right to erectawharf beyond lowwater mark (Naglee v. In'gersoll, 7 Penn. St. 185, 201; Tinicum
Pishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Id. 81) ; and the title to the structure so
located follows the title to the bed of the river : Id. In the second
place, the wharf in the main is constructed upon the public street,
and the incorporation into it by the borough of the two small pieces
of ground in question does not deprive the wharf of its public character. Accessorium non ducit sed sequitursuumprincipale. Finally,
the steamboat Geneva merely touched at the wharf to receive or
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discharge passengers and cargo, and it is not affirmatively shown
that she used anything but the mouth of the street.
Let a decree be drawn dismissing the libel, with costs.
A. structure of stone, timber or earth
erected upon the shore of a harbor, river,
or other navigable water, for the convenience of loading and unloading vessels,
is called a wharf ; when it projects into
the water it is a pier, and when there is
no particular artificial structure but the
mere natural bank it is generally known
as a landing. Any construction of timber
or stone upon the bank of a non-tidal
stream, of such shape that a vessel may
lay alongside of it with its broadside to
the shore, is a wharf, as is also a paved
street extending to the water's edge and
used by vessels as a place for receiving
and discharging freight : City qf Keokuk
v. The Keokuk IV. L. P. Co., 45 Iowa
196; Gieger v. ilor, 8 Fla. 325,
In this note we propose to consider
some of'the general questions growing
out of the construction and management
of wharves.
I. Wharves and landing-places may be
private or public, although the property
may be in an individual owner. In other
words; the owner may have the right to
the exclusive enjoyment of the structure
and to exclude all other persons from its
use, or he may Ce under obligation to
concede to others the privilege of landing their goods, or of mooring their vessels, upon payment of a reasonable
compensation as wharfage. Whether a.
wharf is public or private will depend, in
case of dispute, upon several considerations, involving the purpose for which it
was built, the use to which it has been
applied, the place where located, and the
nature and character of the structure.
Undoubtedly a riparian owner may construct such improvement for his own
exclusive use and benefit. And where it
is not erected and located in a harbor, or
other usual resting place for vessels, and
is confined within the shore of the sea,

or the navigable waters of the lake, and
has never been used by others, or held
out as intended for such use, no implication arises that the owner has ever given
his consent to the use of such wharf by
the public. Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black
23. Nor will the mere fact that the
owner allows others to use his wharf
amount to a dedication of it to the public. O'Neill v. Annett, 27 N. J. L. 290.
The right to the exclusive use of a
wharf by an individual does not depend
upon whether it is constructed above or
below low-water mark, or whether the
shore is or is not publici juris, but solely
upon the question whether in fact and in
law the title to the wharf is vested in
the individual, no matter how that title
may have been acquired. O'Neill v.
Annet, supra.
At common law no one has the right
to land goods upon the land of another
on the bank of a navigable river without
the owner's consent, except in cases of
necessity or danger. Mr. Justice HoLnovD, in Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. &
A. 268, says: " It is not by the common
law, nor is it by statute, lawful to come
with, or land or ship, customable goods,
in creeks or havens, or other places out
of the ports, unless in cases of danger or
necessitjr; nor fish, nor land other goods
not customable, where the shore or land
adjoining is private property, unless
upon the person's own soil, or with the
leave of the owner thereof." And to
the same effect see Chambers v. Furry, I
Yeates 167 ; Ball v. Slak, 2 Whar.
508 ; Cooper v. Smith, 9 S. & R. 26.
When, however, a wharf is constructed and thrown open to the use of
the public, this act, like keeping an inn,
confers a general license on all persons
to occupy it for all lawful purposes;
when such is the case, it is not necessary
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to make an express application for the
172; Heaney v. Heeney, 2 Denio 625 ;
privilege of using it for the purpose for
Ttor ton v. Grant, 10 R. I. 477; s. c.
which it was evidently erected. The
14 Am. R. 701; Dutton v. Strong, 1
mind of the owner is presumed to assent Black 23; Railroad Co. v. Schurmier,
to such use : Heaney v. Heeney, 2 Denio
7 Wall. 272; Weber v. Harbor Commis625 ; Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 ; sioners, 18 Wall. 57 ; City of Galveston
Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black 23, distinv. MJesnard, 23 Texas 349,407; Irwin v.
guished from Heoney v. Heeney, supra.
Dixon, 9 How. 10. And see generally,
11. There is much conflict among the Lag v. King, 5 Day 72 ; Coinmonweath
decisions as to the extent of the rights v. Shaw, 14 S. & R. 9; Bowman v.
of riparian proprietors. At common
Wathen, 2 McLean C. C. 376 ; Bell v.
law, the right in the soil between high Hull, 4c., R. R. Co., 6 MT[.& W. 699 ;
and low water mark was in the king :
Wilson v. Inloes, 11 G. & J. 351 ; Feet
Angell on Tide Waters 180. And in v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42; Wheeling
some of the United States the same docBridge Case, 13 How. 519; Gilman v.
trine prevails-thus giving the paramount
Phdladelphia, 3 Wall. 713; O'Niell v.
right to the public. But our purpose at Annett, 3 Dutch. 290; FRtchburg Railpresent is not to consider the rights of
road Co. v. Boston, &c., Co., 3 Cush.
riparian owners further than the right to 58; Keyport Steamboat Co. v. Farmer
construct wharves. This right is genTrans. Co., 18 N.,J. Eq. 516 ; Storerv.
erally recognised as being inherent in the Freeman, 6 Mass. 435; Sale v. Pratt,
owner of theland. Independent of statu19 Pick. 191 ; Austin v. Carter, 1 Mass.
tory restrictions, the establishment of a
231 ; Commonwealth v. Charleston, I
wharf on land bordering upon tide- Pick. 180; -Parkmanv. Welch, 19 Id. 235;
water, lakes or navigable rivers, by the
Ingrahamv. TWilkinson, 4 Id. 268; Lapish
owner thereof, is a lawful use of the v. Bangor Bank, 8 Greenl. 85; Moore
land. This right exists as an incident
v. Griffin, 9 Shep. 350; Burrows v.
to proprietorship and independent of
Gallup, 32 Conn. 493; Chapman v.
special legislative authority, bvt it ter- .imball, 9 Id. 138.
minates at the point of navigability. He
In some states, the right of the ripamust exercise his right so as not to inter- rian owner extends only to high water
fere with the rights of others, and the mark, and all below that belongs to the
right of navigation is a public paramount
state. But the upland proprietor is alright which must not be obstructed : Conlowed to have an inchoate right, either
monwealth v. Crowniashield, 2 Dane's with or without a license, to acquire an
Abr. 696; East Haven v. Hemingway, 7
exclusive right to the use of the lowland
Conn. 186 ; Simons v. French, 25 Conn. by erecting a wharf or otherwise im346 ; Bell v. Gough, 23 N. J. L. 624;
proving the landing. Such improvement,
Kean v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 492; State v.
however, gives him no property in the
Wilson, 42 Me. 9 ; Wetmore v. Atlantic land under the water. At any time
White Lead Co., 37 Barb. 70 ; Stevens v.
before it is reclaimed by the upland proPaterson, 4-c., R. R. Co., 34 N. J. L.
prietor and thus annexed to his land, it
532; s. c. 14 Am. R. 707 ; Bainbridge may be granted by the state to a stranger :
v. Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364; s. c. 41 Id.
Wletmore v. Brooklyn Gas Co., 42 N. Y.
35; s. c. 13 Am. R. 302; Rice v.
384; Ledyard v. Ten Eyke, 36 Barb.
Paddiman, 10 Mich. 125 ; Lorman v.
102; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L.
Benson, 8 Id. 18 ; Yates v. Milwaukee, 530. See Simpson v. Neill, 89 Pa. St.
10 Wall. 497 ; Grant v. City of Daven- 183.
port, 18 Iowa 179 ; Ensminger v. People,
In Grant v. City of Davenport, 18
47 Ill. 384; CMcago v. Laf.flik, 49 Ill. Iowa 179, 192, Chief Justice WRIGHT
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observed: "In thus holding, it must be
borne in mind that this wharf does not
interrupt nor interfere with the free
navigation of the river. On the contrary, it rather assists than obstructs it.
* * * We entertain no doubt as to the
right of the riparian proprietor (outside
of any incorporated city or town), to
erect wharves or landing-places on the
shores of navigable rivers if they ,conform to state legislations (if any), and
do not obstruct the paramount right of
navigation. The right is expressly recognised in Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black
23, and we can find no ease to the contrary. If the proprietor's land is within
the limits of an incorporated town or
city, this right must yield to the paramount right (when the right is given by
the law of its creation) of the corporation to build, erect and regulate the
wharves and landings :" Attorney-General v. Richards, 2 Anstr. 603; AttorneyGeneral v. Philpot, 2 Id. 607 ; AttorneyGeneral v. Cleaver, 18 Yes. Jr., 218;
Rex v. Ward, 4 A. & E. 384; Rex v.
Russell, 6 B. & 0. 566; Attorney-General v. Parmeter,10 Price 379 ; AttorneyGeneral v. Burridge, 10 Id. 350; Attorney-General v. Forbes, 2 Myl. & Cr.
123; Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Myl. & K.
169; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica, &c.,
Co., 6 Paige 554; Attorney-General v.
Cohoes, 6 Id. 133; Commissioners v.
Wright, 6 Am. Jur. 185, and cases cited
above.
Thus, it is seen that the right to construct a wharf on navigable water is
subject to the condition that it must not
obstruct the paramount right of navigation. If it interferes with navigation,
it is a nuisance, but the fact must be
shown and will not be presumed. A
wharf, even in navigable water, is not
a nuisance per se : Dutton v. Strong, 1
Black 23 ; Rex v. Grosvenor, 2 Starkie
448; Rex v. Russell, 6 B. & C. 566;
Rex v. Ward, 4 A. & E. 384; Rex v.
Morris, 1 B. & A. 441 ; Reg. v. Betts,
16 Q. B. 1022; Beg. v. Tindall, 6 A.

&; E. 143, affirmed in Reg. v. Russell, 3
3 E. & B. 942; Reg. v. Randall, 1 Car.
& M. 496.
"The doctrine of these cases," says
Mr.Justice DunEE, "is that the erection of a wharf in tide-water is not a
nuisance if the navigation is not injured
by the erection. If, however, we inquire
what is the degree of obstruction which,
in contemplation of law, amounts to an
injury to navigation, the cases do not
furnish an entirely satisfactory answer.
In some of the cases, this question appears to have been left very much at
large to the good sense of the jury;
while in others, as in Rex v. Grosvenor
and Reg. v. Randall, language was used
which would seem to imply that almost
any inconvenience to navigation would
constitute an indictable nuisance." See
Folce v. Chad, 3 Doug. (Eng.) 340;
Mllayor ol Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B.
339 ; Gannv. ne F.F.§- W., 11 H.
of L. Cas. 192.
Any permanent structure which interferes with, endangers or obstructs navigation is a nuisance. Such obstructions
are unlawful, and no considerations of
convenience or utility will justify them:
Wis. inp. Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61 ;
Packet Co. v. Atlee, 2 Dillon 0. 0. 479.
But it must be in fact a nuisance, and
not merely so declared by a city council.
"It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in
this country, that a municipal corporation,
without any general laws either of the
city or state within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can,
by its mere declaration that it is one,
subject it tdcremoval by any person supposed to he aggrieved, or even by the
city itself. This would place every
house, every business, and all the property of the city, at the uncontrolled will
ofthe temporary local authorities :" Yates
v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497. "In all
incorporated towns or cities located on
navigable waters," says Mr. Justice
MILLER, in Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall.
389, "there is in their charters or in
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some general statute of the state, either
express or implied, power for the establishment and regulation of these landings. This may be done by the legislatire of the state, or by authority, express or implied, delegated to the local
municipal govqrnment. In all such cases
there is exercised a control over the location, erection and use of such wharves or
landings which will prevent their being
made obstructions to* navigation and
The
standing menaces of danger.
wharves or piers are generally located
by lines bearing such relation to the
shore and to the navigable waters as to
prevent danger to vessels using the river,
and the control which the state exercises
over them is such as to secure at once
their usefulness and safety. These obstructions are also allowable in a part
of the water which could be used for
navigation, on the ground that they
are essential aids to navigation itself.
(But see same case, 2 Dillon C. C.
479.) The navigable streams of the
country would be of little value for that
purpose if they had no places where the
vessels they floated could land, with conveniences for receiving and discharging
cargoes, for lying by safely until this is
done, and then departing with ease and
security in the further prosecution of
their voyage. Wharves and piers are as
necessary almost to the successful use of
the stream in navigation as the vessels
themselves, and are to be considered as
an important part of the instrumentalities df this branch of commerce. But to
be of any value in this respect, they
must reach so far into deep water as to
enable the vessels used in ordinary navigation to float while they use them and
are lashed to their sides. They must, of
necessity, occupy a part of the stream
over which a vessel could float if they
were not there :" Bainbridgev. Sherlock,
29 Ind. 364, and see the same case as
modified in 41 Id. 35.
This right of the riparian proprietor
to the use of his water-front excludes all

others from erecting wharves or other
improvements for the benefit of commerce between high and low-water mark.
Such a structure would have to rest upon
the land of the riparian owner, and
would he inconsistent with his rights:
Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Porter 9; People
Davidson, 30 Cal. 379. If a private
party erects a wharf upon land belonging to a city, he can have no rights in it
except such as belong to the public at
large. Possession of the wharf can, in
such a case, be recovered in ejectment,
and thereafter it can be managed by the
city according to its own views of public
policy: People v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379 ;
Walker v. State Harbor Commissioners,
17 Wall. 648; Packet Co. v. Atlee, 2
Dillon C. 0. 479.
If a municipality is a riparian owner
it has the same power to erect and control wharves as a private owner. Thus,
the city of Boston was held to have the
same rights as other littoral proprietors,
and not to have dedicated a dock which it
owned to the public by merely abstaining
from any control over it. "The people
of Boston who owned the land as their
common and private property, acted
through a corporation, whose corporate
grants and licenses are matters of record.
Their own use of their own property for
their own benefit, cannot be called a
dedication of it to any other public or
wider extent. Whether it was called
' town dockI or 'public dock' (which
were used as synonymous terms), would
furnish no ground to presume that they
had parted with their right to govern and
use it in the manner most beneficial to
the people or public of the town or city :"
Boston v. Leeraw, 17 Hlow. 426; Commonwealth v. .Roxbury, 9 Gray 514, 519,
and note.
The general powers which municipal
corporations possess over wharves are
derived from the legislature: Snyder v.
Rocl-port, 6 Ad. 237 ; Railroad Co. v.
Winthrop, 5 La. Ann. 36 ; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 31. This author-
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ity to erect wharves and charge compensation for keeping them and their approaches in a safe condition, is one of
the special powers conferred by the legislature upon municipalities bordering upon
navigable water: Commonwealth v. Alger,
7 Cush. 53, 82 ; Municilpality v. Pease,
2 La. Ann. 538; Pollard's Lessees v.
Hagan, 3 How. 212 ; Worsley v. M1.unicipality, 9 Rob. (La.) 324 ; The Wharf
Case, 3 Bland's Ch. 383; Illinois, 6-c., Co.
v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon C. C. 70; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 735 ;
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 ; Webe,
v. Harbor Commissioners, 11 Wall. 57 ;
Packet Co. v. St- Louts, 100 U. S. 423;
TFicksburg v. Tobin, 100 Id. 430. And
it may make them the depositaries of it
in such a meisure as it deems expedient:
Fuller v. Edings, 11 Rich. L. (S. C.)
239 ; Waddingham v. St. Louis, 14 31o.,
190; Baltimore v. White, 3 Gill. 444;
Weber v. HarborCommissioners, 18 Wall.
57. Hence, unless expressly empowered
by its charter to erect a wharf, a municipality cannot do so as an independent
undertaking. But it will not be prevented from grading its streets merely
because the river end of one will be used
as a wharf. It has the right to improve
the street by grading it down to the
river, and if in doing this in the manner
pointed out by law, a wharf and steamboat landing results, it would be perfectly legal, and a peculiarly fortunate
incident to the town :" Snyderv. Rockport, 6 Ind. 237.
Where a city charter provides that it
"shall have control of the landing,
wharfage and dockage of boats," it
may establish and construct wharves and
collect a reasonable compensation for
their use. The intention to charge for
its use must be expressed in some manner, either by ordinance or otherwise.
Such a wharf will be presumed to be for
the benefit of the public, like the paving
of a street or other such improvement.
Municipalities have different relations
from those of individual riparian pro-

prietors.

In case the latter erected a

wharf, the presumption might be that he
intended to charge for the use of it. He
has no public duties to perform, but acts
solely in an individual capacity. But it
is otherwise with public corporations.
As a general rule, they act in a public
capacity and for a public purpose: A/uscatine v. Keokuk Northern L. P. Co., 45
Iowa 185.
Where a city is authorized by its
charter to establish and regulate the use
of wharves, fix the rate of wharfage and
regulate the anchorage and mooring of
boats and rafts, it may, by ordinances,
prohibit others from using any place
other than the established wharf, without
the permission of the city and payment
of the ordinary wharfage fee.
The
power to prohibit the establishment of
other wharves or landings is a necessary
part of the power to erect and regulate:
City of Dubuque v. Stout, 32 Iowa 80.
So power to erect wharves includes
the power to condemn private property
for that purpose. It is held in Iowa that
a railway company may, with the consent of the municipal authorities, lay its
track in the streets of the city, whether
the fee is in the city or the adjoining proprietor ; Milburn v. Cedar Rapids, 12
Iowa 249 ; Clinton v. C. R. J, M. R.
R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 ; Tomlin v. D. B.
ff. R. R. Co., 32 Iowa 106 ; '. X.
4,S. R. R. Co. v. Newton, 36 Iowa299 ;
Cook v. Burlington, 36 Id. 357 ; Clinton v. C. 4- L. R. R. Co., 37 Id. 61 ;
Ingran v. C. D. 4- l. R. B. Co-., 38
Id. 669 ; and the Supreme Court of the
United States, following the general rule
that it should adopt the construction put
upon such statutes by. the state courts
(Braney v. Keokuc, 4 Dillon C. C. 593;
Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427;
Lefflngwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599;
Christyv. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196 ; Nichols
v. Levy, 5 Id. 433; Shipp v. Miller's
Heirs, 2 Wheat. 316; Jackson v. Chew,
12 Id. 162; Swjft v..Tyson, 16 Peters
17), have held that a municipality may, in
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that state, authorize a steamboat company to erect a building for the receipt
and shipment of merchandise, on or near
the banks of a river in front of private
lots, reserving municipal and public conrrol over such structure: Barney v.
Keol.k, 4 Dillon 0. C. 593, affirmed in
94 U. S. 324. Power to erect a wharf
and condemn private property therefor,
includes power to extend a wharf already
in existence, and to appropriate the necessary land for that purpose upon making
proper compensation to the owner: Hannibal v. Winchell, 54 Mo. 172.
III. By virtue of its general power,
the legislature may grant to an individual
the exclusive right to erect and keep a
public toll wharf within certain prescribed
limits ; such a grant is not in conflict with
a clause in the constitution of the state
providing "that no man or set of men
are entitled to exclusive, separate, public
emoluments-or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public
services." It will be presumed to be in
consideration of public services, as it is
beneficial to the public: Mlartin v.
O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21 ; Charles Riper
Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet.
420.
Navigable waters and their shores are
primarily under the control of the United
States, and state legislation, to be valid,
must be in conformity with the laws
passed by Congress for the regulation of
commerce. But state laws regulating
harbors, when not in direct conflict with
the federal constitution or legislature,
are valid: Steamship Co. v. JolifTe, 2
Wall. 450 ; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 296 ; Pollard'sLessees v.
Hagan, 3 How. 212; Cisco v. Roberts,
36 N. Y. 292; Port Wardens v. Pratt,
10 Rob. (La.) 459; Chapman v. Miller,
2 Spear's Law 769; Alexander v. B. R.
Co., 3 Strob. (S. 0.) Law 594; State
v. City Counsel, 4 Rich. Law 286; Commonvealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Jeffersonville v. Ferry Boat, 35 Ind. 19 ;
ffarbor .ilaster v. Southerland, 47 Ala.
VOL. XXXI.-75

511. But any law which imposes a duty •
or tonnage is a regulation of commerce
and void; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20
Wall. 577; Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3
Dillon C. C. 454; Peete v. Morgan, 19
Wall. 581 ; Steamboat Co. v. Port IVardens, 6 Id. 31. But a statute fixing a
reasonable rate of compensation to be
paid to a wharfinger for the use of his
wharf by a vessel moored thereto, is not
a tax on tonnage or an impediment to
commerce: The Barge John If. Wldch,
9 Ben. 507. Nor is a regulation of
wharfage by a municipality proportionate
to the vessel's tonnage a violation of any
provisions of the Federal Constitution :
Ellerman v. Alclains, 30 La. Ann.
(Part 11.) 190.
The right of a municipal corporation
to regulate wharves may be either express
or implied. Even when conferred in
terms, the power must, like other powers,
be construed somewhat strictly when it
affects private rights. The power to
regulate must not be construed as a power
to destroy: Grant v. City of Davenport,
18 Iowa 179. Tihus, it has been held
that even where the corporation boundaries extend to low-water mark, and the
charter gives express power to erect and
occupy all wharves and levees within the
corporate limits of the city, the corporation has no power to control the bank so
as to compel the riparian owner, whose
rights extend to low-water mark, to take
out a license for his wharf-boat fastened
to the shore of his own land and used for
his own business: McLaugldin v. Stevens,
18 Ohio 94; Muscatine v. Bershey, 18
Iowa 39 ; Alartin v. Evansville, 32 Ind.
85.
But it may refuse its consent to the
construction of a wharf, or may grant it
with such conditions, limitations and
restrictions as it may deem most beneficial to the navigation and use of the par;
of the city. Thus, it may grant the
privilege upon the condition that the ex.
terior margin shall constitute a public
-wharf: Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill. 444.
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* The power to regulate public wharves
gives no power over private wharves.
Thus, where a charter provided for regulating wharfage "of all articles brought
to public landings in the said district,"
a by-law levying a fine on any person or
persons who "1shall sell on any of the
wharves or landings within the said
district, any cord-wood, unless the same
shall have been corded or measured by
the proper corder," is, so far as it respects private wharves, invalid. "Their
powers in this particular are limited by
the act of incorporation to public landings, and their public estate. Their
special authority respecting the authority
of individuals must appear on the face of
the proceedings to be strictly pursued :"
Commissioners v. Neil, 3 Yeates 54.
In Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Gush.
53, it was held, that the Commonwealth
had power to establish lines in the barbor
of Boston beyond which no wharf should
be extended or maintained, and to declare
a wharf erected beyond such lines a public nuisance, and that such a statute
takes away the rights of the proprietors
of fiats in the harbor beyond the line, to
build thereon even where such erections
would in no manner interfere with navigation : that such statutes, although they
provide for no compensation to such proprietors, are not unconstitutional, as taking private property and appropriating
it to public use without compensation to
the owner. See Hart v. Mayor, 4-c., 9
Wend. 571; affirming 3 Paige 213;
Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gaslight Co., 42
Is. Y. 384 ; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 Id.
287 ; s. a. 28 Id. 396 ; Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Port. 9 ; Mobile v. Eslava, 9 Id.
577; Bailroad Co. v. Winthrop, 5 La.
Ann. 36. But in Yates v. Milwaukee,
10 Wall:498, Mr. Justice MaILLR says:
"1We are of opinion that the city of
Milwaukee cannot, by creating a mere'
artificial and imaginary dock-line, hundreds of feet away from the navigable
parts of the river, and without making
the river navigable up to that line, de-

prive riparian owners of the right to
avail themselves of the advantage of the
navigable channel by building wharves
and docks to it for that purpose."
In Illinois v. Canal Co., 2 Dillon C.
0. 70, the question arose as to what
were the proper uses to which a city
could put a public wharf. The precise
question in the case was whether under
an ordinance not expressly prohibitory,
the city could authorize the erection of a
grain elevator thereon to facilitate the
handling of grain at the wharf. In the
course of an elaborate opinion, Judge
DILLoN says: " A wharf differs in
many material respects from a street.
The latter is primarily intended for the
purposes of passage or travel, and any
structure on it without legislative authority is a nuisance ; but a wharf is intended
to furnish conveniences for the landing
of vessels, the loading or unloading of
their cargoes, and to supply a place on
which wares discharged from vessels or
awaiting shipment may be deposited ;
and it would seem Qsat structures or appliances of any kind intended, and which
have the effect to facilitate the landing
and preservation of merchandise arriving at the wharf, erected upon it under
municipal authority, and remaining at all
times subject to municipal control, 'would
be lawful and within the purpose for
which the wharf property was acquired
or dedicated. We do not say that the
municipal authorities could use the wharf
property for mere warehouse purposes,
though we have no doubt that it would
be competent for them to erect or authorize the erection thereon of such structures
for the receipt and shipment of goods by
water, as they might deem expedient in
order to promote the trade and commerce
of the city. And we are clearly of
opinion that the erection, under the sanction of the city, of an elevator to be used
in handling of grain at the wharf, and at
all times under the direction and control
of the municipal authorities, is such a
use of wharf property as does not fall
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without the scope of dedication, and such
a structure would not, therefore, be a
public nuisance. We have not met with
nor have the counsel cited any adjudication upon the precise point; and we
have, therefore, been compelled to decide
it upon principle, and have felt that it
was due to the importance of the question to set forth our views, as we have
done with considerable fulness." See
Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis
G..E. Co., 10 lo. App. 401.
But under the power to regulate, a city
cannot surrender to private individuals
the exclusive use of a wharf for a fixed
period. Powers conferred upon municipal corporations for public purposes, cannot be delegated to others, or surrendered, or renounced. Such corporations
may adopt by-laws, or make authorized
contracts, but they have no power to
enter into contracts or pass ordinances
which shall cede away, control, or embarrass their legislative or governmental
powers, or which shall disable them at any
time from performing their public duties:
Illinois, 6-c., Canal Co. v. St. Louis, 2
Dillon 0. 0, 70 ; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23
Mlich. 344 ; People's Railroad v. Memphis Railroad, 10 Wall. 380 ; Louisville
City Railroadv. Louisville, 8 Bush 415 ;
Brooldyn v. City Railroad Co., 47 N. Y.
475 ; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 Id. 611 ;
PResb. Church v. Mayor, fc., 5 Cowen
538; Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 4c., 7 Id.
588; Saving Fund v. Philadelphia, 31
Pa. St. 175 ; Ex parte fayor, 4-c., of
Albany, 23 Wend. 277; Railroad Co.
v. Miiayor, 6-c., I Hill 562, 568; Martin v. Miayor, 4c., 1 Hill 548; Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593 ; State
v. Graves, 19 MId. 351, 373; Branson v.
Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St. 329; Dingman
v. People, 5 1 Ill. 277 ; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mlass. 19 ; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 445 ; State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 262 ; .Jackson
v. Bowman, 39 Mliss. 671 ; Oakland v.
Carpentzer, 13 Cal. 540; Smith v. Morse,
2 Id. 524 ; and see Attorney- General v.

Mayor, 4-c., 3 Duer 119, 131, 534;
Davis v. Mayor, 4-c., 14 N. Y. 506;
Costarv. Brush, 26 Wend. 628; Cooley's
Const. Lim. 206.
IV. The right to erect a wharf carries
with it a reasonable compensation for its
use: Ensminger v. People, 47 Ill. 384;
Chicago v. Laflin, 49 Id. 172 ; The Kate
Tremaine, 5 Ben. 60; Radway v. Briggs,
37 N. Y. 256. The owner of a private
wharf may allow others to use it and
charge a compensation therefor, or he
may use it for his own business to the
exclusion of others: The Volusia, 3
Wall., Jr., 375. So, a municipal corporation owning improved wharves and
maintaining them at its own cost, may
charge and collect such compensation
from parties using them as will be a fair
Packet
and reasonable remuneration.
Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 Id. 430 ; Packet Co. v.
Keokuk, 95 Id. 80. Such a provision is
not in conflict with the Constituti~n of
the United States. But a regulation by
which vessels from another state are
required to pay fees not exacted from
domestic vessels, is invalid: Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434.
In some cases wharfage has been allowed when no artificial improvements
were made. "A wharf," says HEYlENFELDT, J., in Sacramento Steamship
New World, 4 Cal. 41, "is, properly
speaking, an artificial construction, and
to such its meaning must be limited ; but
it does not follow that the defihition of
wharfage is to be confined to the charge
for landing at a wharf. Words must be
taken according to that most universal
acceptation in common use, and so we
find the term wharfage generally applied
to a charge for landing goods, whether
upon an artificial erection or a natural
landing. See Dubuque v. Stout, 32 Iowa
80. But it may now be considered as
settled that the proprietor of a wharf
privilege must, in some manner, improve
the shore or make preparations for the
reception and delivery of goods, or the
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accommodation of vessels, before he, can
collect toll or wharfage, oiherwise he is
only entitled to a reasonable compensation for the use of the river front. It
was settled by Cannon v. New Orleans,
20 Wall. 579, that it does not lie within
the power of a state or municipal corporation to impose a tax for the mere
privilege of using the banks of navigable
rivers for purposes of navigation. And
in New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31 La. Ann.
65, it was said: "The only ground on
which any sum can be claimed by the
front proprietors from the owners of vessels for mooring at the banks of public
navigable waters, and their discharging
and receiving cargoes, is that such proprietor, by the expenditure of money
and labor, has constructed and maintained
works which facilitate the discharging
and receiving of cargoes, and afford
to vessels the means of mooring and remaining in security: Railroad Co. v.
Ellelnan, 105 U. S. 166; Packet Co. v.
Keokuk, 95 Id. 88; Mayor, 4-c., of
St. Martinsville v. Steamer fary Leuis,
32 La. Ann. 1293; Columbus v. Grey,
2 Bush 476 ; and see dictum of Chief
Justice WmixT in .Muscatinev. H7ershey,
18 Iowa 39.
Kennedy v. Covington, 17 B. Mon.
567, grew out of the conflicting claims
of the owner of a ferry franchise and the
city. The city of Covington extended
to the river, and the strip of land next to
the river was held in trust for the use of
the city, and also for the use of the
owners of the ferry franchise. It was
acknowledged that the city had the right
to erect wharves on the strip of ground
referred to, or to use it in any manner calculated to promote the prosperity of the
city or the convenience of its inhabitants,
not inconsistent with the exercise of the
ferry franchise belonging to the plaintiff.
The owners of the ferry franchise claimed
that they had a right to land at the city
wharf, as an incident to their ferry franchise, without being required to pay
wharfage. SimrsoN, J"., observes: "It

is a well-settled principle of law that
every owner of property shall use and
exercise the rights incident thereto so
as not to interfere with the rights and
privileges which belong to other persons.
Now, in this case, both the parties have
rights which attach to the same property,
one of them the right to use it as a ferry
landing i the other to use it for the benefit
of the city and the convenience of its inhabitants. To the full enjoyment of the
right which belongs to the city, the grading and paving of the landing, and the
construction of the wharves is indispensably necessary. For the accomplishment of this object a considerable expendituie of money is required, and by the
accomplishment the interest of both parties is evidently promoted. The construction of wharves increases the business, the prosperity and the growth of
the city, and thereby contributes to the
enhancement of the value of the ferry
property, by a corresponding increase of
its business. As, therefore, the city is
compelled to incur a large expenditure
to enable her to have the full enjoyment
of her rights in the common property,
and as it operates to the advantage of
both parties, every principle of equity
and justice requires that the owners of
the ferry, if they use the improvements,
should be made liable in some form or
other, to contribute their rateable proportion to the cost of the construction. This
liability cannot, however, authorize the
city to subject them to the payment of
regular wharfage. Such a charge might
materially diminish the value of the ferry
franchise. * * * We have, however, concluded that they ought to pay one-half the
cost of constructing so much of the wharf
at the foot of Scott street, as is necessary
for the convenient landing of their boats
and the passengers therein, and which
they have been using for that purpose."
A city authorized to collect wharfage
"for any vessel lying at anchor within
any slip," cannot maintain an action for
wharfage against a vessel attached to an
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adjacent pier, even though it occupies
the greater part of the slip between the
pier. A vessel is not lying at anchor
within the meaning of the statute when
it is fastened to a pier: Walsh v. N. Y.
-. 6- D. Co., 77 N. Y. 448.
When a vessel alongside of a public
wharf or pieris accidentally burned without fault of the owner, and sinks near
the mouth of the slip, thus obstructing
the slip or bulkhead so as to prevent other
vessels from coming in, those entitled to
-wharfage cannot recover for the loss occasioned thereby without first showing
that the owner of the vessel could, with
proper care and-diligence, have removed
the wreck so as to prevent its being a
cause of injury: Hancock v. The Tork
6-c., Railway, 10 Com. B. 349. And
as such piers and bulkheads are open to
the common use of the public for any
purpose connected with the loading, unloading or repairing of vessels and securing their cargoes, whether in vessels
afloat or sunk, when not prohibited by
statute or ordinance, their use in attempting to raise the vessel and recover the
property when it neither incommodes the
loading or unloading of vessels, or the
passing or repassing of carts, nor in any
way injures the structure itself, gives no
right of action for wharfage: Taylor v.
Atlantic ltutual Ins. Co., 2 Bosw. 106.
The lessee of a public wharf is entitled
to the wharfage accruing thereat, but the
public character of the wharf is in no
manner changed. Vessels resorting to it
are still subject to the same general rules
regulating the use of public wharves and
slips: Commissioners of Pilots v. Clark,
33 N. Y. 251. The diminution of the
trade and consequently of the value of a
wharf other than by the act of the lessor,
is not an interference with the right to
collect wharfage. Thus, A. leased from
a city a wharf for a certain period, the
city binding itself for indemnity if the
" right to collect wharfage was suspended
for any period by the intervention of
third parties." It was held that a di-

minution of trade on the river caused by
the rebellion, did not interfere with his
right "to collect," and hence he had no
claim for indemnity from the city. The
same lease provided "that in case the
right to collect wharfage or rents should
be defeated permanently through the instrumentality or aid of the mayor and
council of the city," 'and it was held that
his right was not defeated within the
meaning of the clause by an ordinance
which the lessee himself caused to be
passed, nor by a tax other than wharfage, which the city had a right to lay, or
by a quarantine embargo laid with lessee's consent: Marshall v. icksburg, 15
Wall. 146. Where freight is carried
from wharf A. over wharf B., the owner
of whurf B. can collect wharfage at the
same rate as though the original delivery
had been upon his wharf: The .T. H.
Starin, 15 Blatch. 473; s. c. Supplement to 45 Conn. 585 ; Union Wharf Co.
v. Hemingway, 12 Id. 293. A wharfowner may charge a higher rate of wharfage when tie goods are removed from
the wharf by means of drays, than when
it is taken away in lighters or other vessels, thus allowing for the wear and tear
of the wharf: Seoule v. San Francisco
Gaslight Co., 54 Cal. 241. And in
London, it is said that wharfingers are
not entitled to wharfage for goods anladen into lighters out of barges fastened
to their wharves : Stephen v. Coster, 3
Burr. 1408. A wharfinger, no less than
a common carrier, may make what contract he pleases as to his compensation.
But, like the keeper of a tavern or warehouse, if he gives notice in advance of
his rates of charges, his customer cannot,
after having assented to the proposed
charges by using the wharf, refuse to pay
on the ground that it is more than a reasonable compensation- Southern Steamship Co. v. Sparks, 22 Texas 657. So,
after a party has used a public wharf
which a city is authorized to establish,
improve and regulate, and charge a
moderate fee for 6xpenses incurred, he
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cannot refuse payment of wharfage on
the ground that it has not been well built
and is in need of further improvements.
"This is not the way to try the question
whether municipal corporations have performed public duties. A mandamus
would, perhaps, lie to compel the borough to provide adequate facilities of
wharfage; tr an injunction at the suit
of some agent of the public to restrain
them from collecting fees for inadequate
performance. In either of the modes the
question would be tried and for all parties interested. But each individual customer cannot raise the question as a defence to charges he has voluntarily incurred. If he does not like the facilities
furnished, he need not use them, but if
he uses them, he must pay for them, so
long as the power of assessment vested in
the borough is not abused I' Prescott v.
Duquesue, 48 Pa. St. 118, per Woon; also Jeffersonville v. Ferry
WARD, C. J7.
Co.,.27 Ind. 100; s. a. 35 Ind. 19 ;
Winpennyv. Philadelpia,65 Pa. St. 135.
The amount of wharfage may, of course,
be regulated by the legislature: Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill. 444; Murphy v.
City Council, 11 Ala. 586. But where
the right to impose wharfage is given to
a municipality, the amount is a matter
entirely at its discretion, and cannot be
interfered with by the courts unless it is
plainly unreasonable. 1 Dillon Mlun.
Corp., sect. 112; Municipalityv. Pease,
2 La. Ann. 538; Muscatine v. Hershey,
18 Iowa 39, 42.
"The government of the municipality
has determined that the rates of wharfage are due as such; from this the state
has not dissented. The responsibility
of the act rests entirely with the muniThe consequences
cipal government.
of the interference of the judiciary in
the details of its finances can be readily
foreseen. * * * If the wharfage is
a tax on commerce, or on imports or
exports, it is unconstitutional, h6wever
small the amount. If it be not per se
unconstitutional, the'unconstitutionality

depending according to the argument on
the unreasonableness of the amount, the
action of the judiciary is brought directly
in conflict with the municipal power on
an administrative question, over which
it must be conceded the city government
is called upon to exercise, to a certain
extent, discretionary power. The judiciary action is pirt forth in favor of
absolute, positive, legal rights, they
must be separated by a distinct line of
demarkation from those which are subject
to the action of other branches of the
government, the interference with which
Muftnicipality v.
must be avoided:"
Pease, supra. As to what is a sufficient
complianc6 with a statute requiring a
a demand of wharfage before a~n action
can be brought, see The Bark Francesca,
9 Ben. 34.
V. The owner of a wharf on a'navigable river is entitled to free access
thereto without unnecessary obstructions
by the acts of other parties : D. R. S.
C. Co. v. B. 6&B. S. F. Co., 81 Pa. St.
103. Hence, a raftsman upon a navigable river, although entitled to use it
for the passage of his rafts or other
water crafts, must do so with due regard
to the rights of others. He must not
moor his rafts so as to interfere with the
rights of a riparian owner to bring boats
to his own wharf, and in case a raft is so
moored and left in charge of no one,
the owner of the wharf may lawfully
untie it and allow it to float away: Harrington v. Edwards, 17 Wis. 536; and
see Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black 23. So a
pier projecting in front of a wharf may
be used in such a manner as to entitle
the wharfinger to damages, as being an
injury to his rights: Camden J-R. R. Co.
v. Finch, 5 Sandf. 48. So a city cannot
obstruct a private wharf by turning the
course of a stream of water so as to
cause sand and earth to form an embankment in front of the wharf, thus preventing other vessels from approaching.
"I cannot permit myself to doubt,"
says AxomR, C. J., in Barrow v.
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.Mayor, &c., of Baltimore, 2 Am. Jur.
204-207, " b ut that the character of the
plaintiff's rights were such that he might
well complain of any; injury to them.
He had the right which every man has
to the benefits flowing from a navigable
stream contiguous to his land. He had
a right to pass and repass with his
vessels. No man has a right to moor a
vessel to his lands without his consent,
and if he was in the habit of asking and
receiving a compensation from owners
of vessels for such consent, and has been
deprived of this benefit and profit by this
filling up of the nayigable stream opposite to his lands, he has been deprived
of an important privilege and been compelled to surrender it for the public
benefit. He has been disseized, or more
properly speaking, deprived of an easement appurtenant to his lands, which
constitutes a great portion of its value.
It would be in vain to guard with such
vigilance the freehold itself, if the liberties and privileges appurtenant to it
were not also subject to constitutional
guardianship. Over the soil covered by
the water, over the water itself, which
belongs to the state, I need not say, he
has no right; but he has a perfect right
to the soil of the wharf itself, to the
profits growing out of the depth of the
navigable water attached to it, which
See
are incident to the soil itself"
Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147, where
this case is approved, and also 7hayer v.
Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; Appeal of Bailey,
9 Phila. 506; Simpson's Appeal, 77 Pa.
St. 270. But a municipal corporation
may construct sewers opening into the
public docks, and use them in a reasonable manner for conducting and depositing therein refuse matter. If such
deposits cause damages to the owner of
a wharf by diminishing the depth of
water about it, and thereby impair its
use for the purpose for which it was constructed and had been used, causing
inconvenience and injury different in
kind from that sustained by the public,

and not merely different in degree or
extent, he may recover damages in a
private suit for such injury. But unless
the damage differs in kind from that
sustained by other persons owning land
on the harbor, no private action can
be sustained. This is a familiar principle and supported by a host of decisions: See Breed v. Lynn, 126 Mass.
218; Blackwell v. Old Colony Railroad,
122 Mass. 12; Brayton v. Fall River,
113 Mass. 218; Huskellv. New Bedford,
108 Mass. 208; Franklin Wharf v. Portland, 46 Maine 42; President, 4-c., of
HarvardCollege v. Stearns, 15 Gray 1;
Brightnan v. .airhaven, 7 Gray 271;
inith v. Boston, 7 Cush. 255; Greasly
v. Codling, 2 Bing. 262; Wilkes v.
Hungerford 3farket, 2 Bing. N. S. 281 ;
Daugherty v. Bunting, 1 Sandf. 1. Nor
will the fact that the plaintiff alone
navigates the stream, or has a wharf
thereon, show more than that he may
suffer in a greater degree than others:
Blackwell v. Old Colony R. 1?. Co., 122
Mass. 1.
The owner of land adjacent to the
shore of a navigable river who obtains
from the commissioner of the land office
a grant of land under water, on which,
after filling in, he rests a wharf, cannot
maintain an action on the case against
the agent of a company to whom the
legislature afterwards granted the privilege of erecting a pier in the river for
the purpose of constructing a basin for
the protection and safety of boats, and
who erects such pier entirely encompassing the wharf on the side of the water
so as to leave no communication between
it and the river, except through a lock at
one extremity of the basin. By authorizing the commissioner of the land office
to make the grant, the legislature did
not preclude itself from making a great
public improvement for the benefit of
commerce, nor was it taking private
property for public use, nor a violation
of any contract, express or implied, on
the part of the stat6. The loss sustained
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by the wharfinger in consequence of the
building of the pier or the construction
of the basin was damnurn absque injuria,
for which no action lies: Lansing v.
Smith, 4 Wend. 9.

In Bainbridge v. Sherlock-, 29 Ind.
364, it was held that a wharf-boat when
moored to the shore is entitled to the
same immunity from trespass as the land
itself. And a navigator landing at one
wharf is not justified by any public right
in the river, in so landing and mooring
his vessel that while landed its side and
stern will be carried by the current
against the wharf-boat of a contiguous
wharfinger, lower down the river, thus
obstructing access to the lower wharf.
But this case was again considered in 41
Ind. 35, and a somewhat modified conelusion reached. It was there held, that
the appellees had the right to run their
boat in any part of the river not then
occupied by other boats or crafts navigating the river, and to stop at any
wharf which their business might require.
"The appellee's wharf or wharf-boat,"
says WonDm, J., "is clearly entitled
to no greater immunity as against a person navigating the river, than if it had
been a floating craft navigating the river,
in' which event, in case of collision,
wilfulness, negligence, or want of skill,
would be necessary in order to hold a
party responsible. * * * We have
already seen that the appellee, whatever
may have been the extent of his title to
the soil, had no right to so construct or
use his wharf as to interfere with the
paramount right of the public to the free
use of the river as a common highway.
The appellants had the legal right to
navigate the river, and every part
thereof, and to stop at such wharves as,
their business might require. And if in
doing so, they by a portion of the length
of their boat, occupied the water in
front of the appellee's wharf, they were
but exercising a legal right and could
not in so doing be trespassing. The
appellee was not, in our opinion, entitled

' to the free use of all the adjacent waters
near to anl in front of his wharf-boat,'
as against parties temporarily occupying
the same, in due course of the navigation
of the river. Such a right in the appellee
would be utterly inconsistent with the
right of the public to the use of the
river as a common highway. The appellants had the right to land at such wharf
or wharves as suited their convenience,
and if in doing so, the current of the
river, or rather circnmstances carried the
stern of their boat down stream so that
a portion of the boat's length lay in front
of the appellee's wharf, but still in the
navigable waters of the river; they were
but in the exercise of a legal right, and
cannot be responsible to the appellee
for any consequential damages which lie
may have sustained by others being
thereby prevented from landing at his
wharf; provided, that the appellants in
thus exercising their rights, exercised
due care, skill and dispatch, and subjected the appellee to as little inconvenience as possible, consistently with
thp exercise of their own rights. Doubtless unreasonable and vexatious delay,
thus wrongfully preventing ingress to
and egress from the appellees wharf,
would subject the appellants to liability
for the damages consequent thereon."
A wharfinger not only has the right to
bring an action and recover damages for
any injury actually done to his wharf,
but he is also entitled to the benefit of
equitable remedies for the prevention
of injuries to his rights: People v.
Davidson, 30 Cal. 379 ; Parkerv. Taylor,
7 Or. 435 (and see this case as to the rights
of riparian owners in Oregon). Thus a
court of equity will interfere to prevent
injury to a private wharf by the erection
of permanent obstructions which interfere with ingress to and egress from a
wharf: Penniman v. N. Y. Balance Co.,
13 How. Fr. (N. Y.) 40 ; or to prevent
a municipal corporation from interfering
with the rights of the owner of a private
wharf by appropriating an adjoining
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slip to the purposes of a public wharf:
Murray v. Sharp, I Bosw. 539 ; or the
construction of another wharf in front
of one already constructed : Cowell v.
M]artin, 43 Cal. 605 ; Crocker v. Mayor
of New York, 15 Fed. Rep. 405. But
on the other hand, a mandatory injunction will not issue to compel the owners
of a private wharf to allow wharfage
facilities to a particular person as well
as others, when they have only exercised
a reasonable discretion in excluding him
on account of the extent of their business: Audenried v. Phila. 6- Reading
B. 1. Co., 68 Pa. St. 370, s. c. 8 Am.
R. 195.
VI. The right to collect wharfage carries with it the correlative duty of keeping
the wharf in repair.
So long as a
wharf is open to the public, it is the
duty of those having control of it to
keep it in a reasonably safe condition:
Radway v. Briggs, 37 N. Y. 256;
Wendall v. Baxter, 12 Gray 494; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Eastman
v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Jeffersonville v. Louisville, 4c., Ferry Co., 27
Ind. 100; Harrison v. Municipality,
Afass. 216 ; Cardeton v. Franconia Iron
and Steel Co., 99 MIass. 216 ; Swords v.
Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28; Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co., II A. & E. 223;
M3fetcalfe v. A therington, 11 Ex. 257, 5
H. & N. 719; Gibbs v. .Mersey Docks, 3
EH.&N. 164 ; L. R., 1 H. ofL. Cas. 93 ;
Longmore v. Great Western R. B. Co.,
35 L. J. C. F. 135; Francisv. Cockrell,
L. R., 5 Q. B. 184; Webb v. Port Bruce
Harbor Co., 19 U. C. Q. B. 626; Coe
v. Vise, L. R., 1 Q. B. 711 ; Winch v.
Conservators of the Thames, L. R., 7 C.
F. 471. As to the duty of keeping pier
lights, see Sweeney v. Port Burwell Barbor Co., 17 U. C. C. IP. 574, reversed in
19 U. C. C. 1?. 376.
A legal transfer of the right to collect
wharfage to a third party subrogates
that party to the duty of keeping the
wharf in repair. Thus the lessee of a
wharf was held liable for the value of a
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horse, cart and load of merchandise,
lost by backing off the wharf into the
water, where there was no suitable guard:
Railway v. Briggs, 37 N. Y. 265. But
where, at the time the lease was made
and the delivery of possession, the wharf
was in a defective and unsafe condition,
and in consequence thereof, while in the
possession of the lessee, an injury happened to one lawfully thereon, it was
held that the lessor, who was receiving
a benefit by way of rent, was liable for
the damage : Swords v. Edgar, 59 N.
Y. 28; and see Louisville v. Bank of
the United States, 3 B. IIon. 144.
Wendell v. Baxter, 12 Gray 494, was a
case where the plaintiff was injured
while in the employ of the lessee of a
wharf. The following instructions given
by the court below were held not error
on appeal. The jury were instructed
"that if 'lhey were satisfied that the
defendants had established the wharf for
the use of the public, and invited the
public to use it for a reasonable compensation, they were bound to keep the
wharf safe for the use for which it was
made and erected at that place ; that
if the plaintiff, being properly on the
wharf, in the prosecution of his business,
and in the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence, sustained the injury alleged, through a defect in the wharf, he
was entitled to recover, unless the defect
was latent, and so hidden and concealed
that it could not be discovered by such
examination and inspection as the construction, use and exposure of the wharf
reasonably required; that if the defendants knew that causes rendering the
wharf unsafe, were constantly or occasionally in operation, which they could,
by the exercise of ordinary diligence
and care, have anticipated and provided
against, they were required to do so."
See also Mayor v. Henley, 3 B. & Ad. 92.
In Eastman v. I.eredith, 36 N. N. 284,
295, PrtLEr, C. J., in speaking of
.ittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54, said :
"This case is put distinctly upon the
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ground that the public duty, which was
the foundation of the action, rose out of
the control which the city exercised over
the wharf, and the income received from
the use of it." The right of action
arises from the duty which the law imposes upon the owners of wharves to
keep them in proper repair, and not
from any contract between the wharfowner and the customer: Callett v.
London and Northwestern Railroad, 11
Ad. & El. N. S. 984, 989; Wendell v.
Baxtex, 12 Gray 494; .1ayor, 6-c., v.
Henley, 3 B. & Ad. 92; Buckbee v.
Brown, 21 Wend. 110.
A city is liable for any damages caused
by a failure to provide proper fastenings
to a public wharf: Shinkle v. Covington,
1 Bush 617 ; Peoplev. Albany, 11 Wend.
539 ; Buckbee v. Brown, 21 Wend. 110 ;
41ercer Doclk Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R., I
H. of L. Cas. 93. Although the owner
of a wharf is not bound to keep a sufficient depth of water at all times to
accommodate all sized vessels, it is his
duty to give imformation of inequalities
of the water when necessary to protect
vessels about to land : Nelson v. Phwnix
Chein. Works, 7 Ben. 37. And he will
be responsible for any damage caused by
such inequalities, to vessels, while lawfully and with due care occupying his
wharf: Barrett v. Black, 56 Me. 498;
Sawyer v. Oakman, 7 Blatch. 290;
Carleton v. FranconiaIron Co., 99 Mass.
216; and see Wendell v. Baxter, 12
Gray 494; Sweeny v. Old Colony and
N. R. R. Co. 10 Allen 368; Elliott v.
Pray, 10 Allen 378; Barnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co., 11 A. &E. 223; Gibbs
v. Trustees, 4-c., 3 H. & N. 164;
Indermaurv. Domes, LR.I., 1 C.P. 274 ;
s. o. Id. 311 ; Thompson v. N. B. R. R.
Co.,2 B. & S. 106; P.R. R. Co.v.
P. S. Co., I IA. &E. 223. But he is
not liable for damages caused by delay,
occasioned by an insuTfficicy of water
in a berth: The Bark Francesca, 9 Ben.
34. Mono, J., in Nickerson v. Tirrell,
127 M-ass. 236, 229, says: "The gen-

cral rules of law applicable in cases of
this character are well settled. The owner
or occupant of a dock is liable in damages
to a person who; by his invitation,
express or implied, makes use of it, for
an injury caused by any defect or unsafe
condition of the dock which the occupant
negligently causes or permits to exist,
if such person was himself in the exercise
of due care. Such occupant is not an
insurer of the safety of his dock, but he
is required to use ordinary care to keep
his dock in such a state as to be reasonably safefor use by vessels which he
invites to enter it, or for which he holds it
out asfit and ready. If he fails to use
such due care-if there is a defect which
is known to him, or which by the use of
ordinary care and diligence should be
known to him, he is guilty of negligence
and liable to the person who, using due
care, is injured thereby."
VII. The liability of a wharfinger for
goods deposited on his wharf does not
differ materially from that of a warehouseman. He must take reasonable common
care of the property intrusted to him,
and is liable for a corresponding degree
of negligence, and the burden of proving
such negligence is upon the party alleging it: Foote v. Storrs, 2 Barb. 326;
Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend. 268; Blin
,.Mayo, 10 Vt. 56 : Sida'ays v. Todd,
2 Starkie 357 ; Story on Bailment, sect.
452 ; Cox v. O'Riley, 4 Ind. 368. But
a wharfinger must be distinguished from
a common carrier. The language of
Lord smspIEn.D, in Ross v. Johnson, 5
Burr. 2827, and of Lord ELan noRoUGrs in 1lfaving v. Todd, 1 Starkie
72, favored the doctrine that wharfingers,
like common carriers, were liable for all
injuries except such as arise from the
act of God or te public enemy. But
this doctrine was ably combatted by
Judge SToRY, in his treatise on Bailments, and it is now settled by the
decisions that he is liable only for the
ordinary care required of a bailee for
hire: Platt v. Hibbard, 7 Cow. 502;
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Garside v. Trent. Nap. Co., 4 T. R.
581; Hyde v. Trent Nav. Co., 5 Id.
339 ; In re Webb, 8 Taunt. 443 ; Roberts
v. Turner, 12 John. 232; Brown v.
Denison, 2 Wend. 593; Cogs v. Bernard,2 Ld. Raym. 909, 218; Sidaways
v. Todd, 2 Starkie a51. But if he
undertakes to convey the goods from the
wharves to a vessel by his own lighter,
he assumes the responsibility of a common carrier, and will be held liable as
such: Maving v. Todd, 1 Starkie 59.
The responsibility of a wharfinger begins
when the goods are delivered on the
wharf and he has expressly or impliedly
received them into his care and custody:
Rodgers v. Stophel, 32 Pa. St. 111;
Quiggin v. Duff, I M. & W. 174; s.
c. 1 Gale 420. But a mere delivery
at the wharf is not necessarily a delivery
to the wharfinger. Some act of assent,
either on his part or by his agent, to the
custody thereof, is necessary before he
will be presumed to have assumed the
character of custodian : Buckman v. Levi,
3 Camp. 414; Gibson v. Inglis, 4 Id.
72 ; Blin v. Mayo, 10 Vt. 56 ; Packard
v. Getman, 6 Cow. 757.
His responsibility ceases as soon as he
ceases to have the custody and control
of the goods. Thus, where goods were
delivered to a wharfinger to be sent on
board a vessel, his responsibility ceased
as soon as the goods were delivered to
the proper officers of the vessel. And
this, by the usage, although they remained upon the wharf: Cobban v.
Dowaps, 5 Esp. 41 ; Alerrett v'.0. C.
and N. R. R. Co., 11 Allen 80 ; Guss v.
iew York, &c., R. P, Co., 992Mass.227.
But a delivery to one of the crew of a
vessel will not be sufficient. It must be
to the captain or some one having authority to receive them: Leigh v. Smith,
1 C. & P. 638; R. & M. 224.
The usages of business in the vicinity
are important to show when a whaifinger acquires and when he ceases tb
have the custody of goods. "By the
usages and customs of business is not

understood to be meant such customs, as
from their continuance have become part
of the common law, but such customs
and usages as are generally regarded and
adopted by the persons doing business in
the vicinity, and with reference to which
contracts are made. The evidence of the
customs and usages of the merchants in
the vicinity of defendant's wharf was
properly received to- show that goods
* were
landed on the wharf * *
not considered as in their custody and
that they did not receive and take care
of them as wharingers :" Blin v. Mayo,
supra. Where the goods are-demanded
by the proper owner and all charges paid,
or tendered, they must be delivered.
But if notified that the goods in his possession bear a spurious trademark, and
that their sale will be enjoined, and he
is requested not to deliver them, he may
lawfully withhold them: Hunt v. Maniere,
34 Beav. 157; 13W. R. 212; 11 L.
T. (N. S.) 469. If he detains goods
and the owner afterwards agrees to
accept them, and actually removes a
part, he is not liable for the destruction
of the balance remaining on the wharf
after the owner has had a reasonable
time to remove it: Carnes v. Nichols, 10
Gray 369. Awharfinger is not estopped
from denying the title of his bailor:
Thorne v. Tilbury, 3 H. & N. 534 ; 27
L. J. Exch. 407. See Biddle v. Bond,
34 L. J. Q. B. 137. But where the
wharfinger had once acknowledged certain goods to be the property of the
plaintiff, it was held that he could not
dispute plaintiff's title in an action of
trover brought against him : Gosling v.
Birnie, 7 Bing. 339 ; M. & P. 531 ;
Hall v. Grtffn, 3 MN.& Scott 732; 10
Id. 246.
VIII. As an incident to the wharfinger's agreement, either express or implied, to properly care for goods left in his
charge, he is entitled to the possession of
them until delivery is demanded and due
compensation made. Thus he has a special interest in the goods which the law
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will protect. Such interest is an insurable one and will be jueluded in a policy
covering " goods in trust." In case
of loss he can recover the fall amount,
but will be liable over for any excess
above his charges. He may at his own
cost and without notice to the owners,
keep a floating policy for the benefit of all
who may become his customers : Waters
v. Monarch F. 6- L. Ins. Co., 5 El. & B.
870; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 375; 25 L. T.
Q. B. 102. See Er parte Batenan, 2
Jar. (N. S.) 265; 25 L. J., Eq. 19 ; 8
DeG.M1. & G. 263.
IX. Like other depositaries for value,
a wharfinger has a lien upon goods
deposited upon his wharf, for the amount
of his charges, and also by the general
usage of the trade for his general balance of accounts: Naylor v. Mangles,
1 Esp. 109, per Lord KEwyox; Spears
v. Hartly, 3 Id. 81 ; Rushforth v. Hadfield, 6 East 519; 7 Id. 224; Holdermess v. Collinson, 7 B. & C. 212; 2
Kent's Corn. (12 ed.) 642. But it has
been said that a custom to extend a lien
for wharfage to all claims which the
wharfinger may have against the owner
of goods is invalid: Leuckhart v. Cooper,
3 ing. N. C. 99 ; Brookman v. Hamill,
48 N. Y. 554. Nor has he any general lien in respect to the labor and
warehouse room, except by agreement,
express or implied, but a general, continued and undisputed usage is evidence
of an agreement : Holderness v. Collinson,
7 B. & C. 212. Nor, can he claim a
lien on the goods of one owner, the
identity of which was not lost in a fire,
from which the whole were saved : Grant
v. Humphery, 3 F. & F. 162. The
wharfinger's lien will prevail over legal
process against the owner of the goods
if it attached prior to the teste of
such process: Rex v. Huraphery, AleC.
& Y. 178. A wharfiuger has a double
remedy for his wharfage, a lien on the
article and a personal lien or claim on
the owner. If the owner sells and a
delivery order is handed to the wharf-

inger, with a tender of the wharfage,
there is no further claim against the
vendor, but the personal claim attaches
to the vendee, on the ground that the
wharfinger is no longer liable to the
vendor for the safe keeping of the
article, and therefore, has no claim on
him, but the wharfinger's liability and
claim passes over to the vendee. After
a sale of the goods and a tender of the
wharfage already due, with proper notice,
the vendor is discharged from liability
for future wharfage. The notice may be
given verbally or by a delivery order:
Wooster v. Blossom, 5 Jones (N. C.)
Law 244; Sage v. Gittner, 1t Barb.
120; Barry v. Lonqfmore, 12 A. & E.
642; Story on Bailments, sect. 452. A
wharfinger has no power to sell merchandise deposited on his wharf, and for
which he is entitled to a compensation in
the shape of wharfage for its safe keeping, though accustomed to sell property
of the same description from the wharf:
see Monk v. Whittenburq, 2 B. & A. 484;
Wilkinson v. King, 2 Camp. 335 ; Kusenburg v. Browne, 42 Pa. St. 173.
A wharfinger has a lien on a vessel
for wharfage. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.
S. 68, was a suit in the nature of a
libel in rem brought by the owner of a
wharf in 'New York, against a barge
coming from Baltimore, to recover the
charges alleged to be due libellant as
wharfage. It was contended that process
could not issue against the barge because
no maritime lien arose in the case. In
the course of the decision, Mr. Chief
Justice WAITE said that wharf accommodations are a necessity of commerce
and indispensable for ships and vessels,
and water-crafts of every name and
description, whether employed in carry- ing freight or palsengers, or engaged in
the fisheries. Erections of the kind are
constructed to enable water-crafts to
lie in port safely, and to facilitate their
operations in loading and unloading their
cargoes, and in receiving and landing
passengers. Piers and wharves are a
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necessary incident to every well regulated
port, without which commerce and navigation would be subjected to great
inconveniences and exposed to vexations
and constant peril. Conveniences of this
kind are wanted both at the port of
departure and of entry, and the expenses
paid at both are everywhere regarded as
properly chargeable as expenses of the
voyage. Such erections are indispensably necessary for the safety and convenience of commerce and navigation,
and those who take berths alongside of
them to secure those objects derive great
benefit from their use. And experience
supports the proposition, and shows to a
demonstration that the contract of a
wharfinger appertains to the pursuit of
commerce and navigation.
Standard
authorities as well as reason, principle,
and the necessities of commerce, support
the theory that the contract for vharfage
is a maritime contract, which in the case
supposed, gives to the proprietor of the
wharf a maritime lien on the ship or
vessel for his security; "viewed in the
light of these considerations, it is clear
that a contract for the use of a wharf by
the master or owner of a ship or vessel
is a maritime contract, and, as such,

that it is cognizable in the admiralty;
that such a contract being one made
exclusively for the benefit of the ship
or vessel, a maritime lien in the case
supposed, arises in favor of the proprietors of the wharf, against the vessel, for
payment of reasonable or customary
charges in that behalf for the use of the
wharf, and that the same may be enforced by a proceeding in rem against the
vessel, or by a suit in personam against
the owner." Johnson v. TcDonough,
Gilpin 101; The Phcebe, Ware 265;
The Kate Tremain, 5 Ben. 60; The
Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. Jr. 435 ; Dalvie v. Booth, 2 Gall. 398; Gardiner v.
Ship New Jersey, I Pet. Adm. 223, per
Judge SToRY; Bark Alaska, 3 Ben.

391; .Eoburt v. Drogan, 10 Pet. 108 ;
The Mercer, 1 Sprague 284; The Ann
Ryan, 7 Ben. 20; Dunlop's Adm. 65;
Abbott's Ship, 423 ; 2 Conk. Adm. 515.
But see The Barge John M. Welch, 9
Ben. 507. As to liens under a statute,
see The Virginia Rudon, 13 Blatch. 519;
The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The
Steamer St. Lawrence, I Black 529.
CnApms BurtE ELLIOTT.
St. Louis.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
WOOD v. LOSEY.
An infant sued for the price of goods does not have the burden of showing that
they were not necessaries. The plaintiff cannot make out his case without showing
that the goods purchased were necessaries, notwithstanding that defendant assumes
the burden of showing them not to be necessary.
An infant sued for the price of a horse sold to him showed that his sole business
was to carry on his mother-in-law's farm for one-third of the produce, and that she
was to furnish all the teams, tools and implements: Held, that this showed that
the horse was not a "necessary" for which he was liable ; and it was error to give
the jury to understand that it was the necessity of the horse to the farming business, instead of to his part in it, that fixed his'liability.
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ERROR to Jackson circuit.
Eammond, Barkcworth g.
&Smith, for plaintiff.
A. ..

ffaynes, for defendant and appellant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Defendant was sued for the price of a horse sold
him by Emery Wood, a brother of plaintiff, who claimed as assignee. The suit was brought before a justice while the defendant
was an infant, and this appears of record. He was still an infant
when the judgment rendered against him by the justice was appealed. Judgment was rendered against him also in the circuit
court for Ingham county. It appeared that defendant had been
garnisheed by a creditor of Emory Wood, and had paid the money
over. But in the present suit this was not, so far as appears, established to have been before some notice of the assignment. Defendant was also prevented by the ruling of the court from showing
fraud in the assignment. If the case could stand unreversed upon
the other matters we should wish to consider whether a garnishee
who has disclosed and paid over money to creditors would not be
entitled, when sued on the same debt, to show that the assignment
was not valid as against the creditors who garnisheed him and who
had, if it was fraudulent, a right to complain themselves of the
assignment. While we do not find ourselves called on to pass
upon this allegation of error, we do not wish to have.it understood
that it is regarded as infounded. We leave it for future consideration.
We think the jury was clearly misled by the course taken below
on the subject of infants' contracts. While the court in the charge
did undoubtedly charge that the plaintiff must show the horse to
have been a necessity to the defendant, the force of this was destroyed by the other charges and refusals to charge. The plaintiff,
although the defendant appeared only as an infant and his infancy
was admitted, made no attempt to do any more than prove the sale
of the horse as if made to a person of full age. When he rested
he had made out no cause of action. If he recovered at all it
could only be because the defendant (who was very unnecessarily
called on by whoever represented his interests to show by way of
defence what the law presumed in his favor) made out a clear case
of necessity. The fact that'the defendant assumed the burden did
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not in any way exonerate plaintiff from making out a full case of
actual necessity. The burden did not cease to be the plaintiff's
burden. Defendant showed that he was carrying on his mother-inlaw's farm for a third of the produce, and that she was to furnish
all the teams, tools and implements. He had no other business.
This showed quite clearly that the horse was not necessary for defendant, and the court should not have refused to so charge. By
refusing this charge and by giving the jury to understand, as we
think they could not fail to understand, that it was the necessity for
the farming business, and not the necessity for the defendant's part
in it that would make him liable, they were led to a verdict which
has no testimony to sustain it. We have had some doubt whether
we could properly grant a new trial upon the reversal. The defendant Was not brought into the case so as to be impleaded in the
way the statute points out. The guardian does not, on the original
rec~rd, appear to have been properly appointed, and he, and not the
defendant, had charge of the original defence and appeal. We are
strongly inclined to regard the whole proceedings as too defective
to bear investigation. Defendant did not assign error on this point,
but it is open on the record, where the issues indicate error, and
may stand in the way of any future judgment for plaintiff. As the
assignments of error now stand we shall reverse the judgment with
costs of both courts up to this time and allow a new trial, if the
plaintiff sees fit to incur the risk.
The other justices concurred.
If the wants of an infant be supplied
boy his parent, guardian or by any other
person, he cannot render himself liable
for articles which would otherwise be
necessaries: Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2
Win. Black. 1325; Gay v. Ballou, 4
Wend. 4011; Rivers v. Gregg, 5 ]Rich.
Eq. 274; Guthrie v. hurphy, 4 Watts
80; Angel v. MlcClellan, 16 Mass. 311
Pool v. Pratt, 1 Chip. 253; Beeler v.
Young, 1 Bibb 521 ; Connolly v. Hull, 3
McCord 6; McKanna v. Merry, 61 IaI.
180; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Geo.
475 ; .Elrodv. M!yers, 2 Head. 33 ; Perrin v. Walson, 10 Ind. 451. Where the
minor resides with his parents, it will, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, be
presumed that he is properly supplied

with necessaries: Connolly v. Bull, 3
McCord 6 ; Jones v. Colvin, 1 MeMull.
14 ; Perrin v. Wilson, 10 Mo. 451 ; Freeman v. Bridges, 4 Jones' Law 4. In-

deed, infancy being shown, the burden
of proof is with the plaintiff to show that
the articles sued for were necessary for
the infant: Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt.
494 ; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Geo. 475.
And this is so whether the articles sued
for come within the class of necessaries
or not: Thrall v. Wright, supra.
An examination of the cases above
referred to can not but convince the
reader that the decision in the principal
case is entirely correct.
It may not be unprofitable to refer to
some other cases illustrating the general
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principles that should be applied in every excluded from the consideration of the
case where the question of necessaries is
jury, was much considered, and the case
involved.
as a whole is a very interesting one. In
The first ituestion to be determined in the court of exchequer the court was
every case appears to be whether the arti- evenly divided as to what is the proper
cles sued for come within the general rule ; but upon appeal to the exchequer
class of necessaries, and this is a matter - chamber a conclusion was arrived at in
accordance with the rule already stated,
of law to be judged of by the court:
and it was unanimously held that there
Beeler v. Young, I Bibb 521 ; Glover v.
Ott, I MleCord 572 ; Bent v. Manning, was not in the case evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find that it was
10 Vt. 230; Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Met.
necessary for maintaining the defendant
563; Grace v. Hale, 2 Humph. 29 ;
Stanton v. Nillson, 3 Day 57 ; McKanna in the station of life in which he moved,
v. Merry, 61 I11..178, Jordan v. Cof- either that he should give a silver goblet
field, 70 N. 0. 110; Merriam v. Cun- worth 151. 15s. to a friend, or wear shirt
buttons composed of diamonds and runingham, 11 Cush. 40. The articles in
question must not only come within the bies, costing 121. 10s. a piece.
See,
general class of necessaries in law, but
also, Brooker v. Scott, 11 Al. & W. 43 ;
must also be in fact necessary to the inBryant v. Richardson, L. R., 3 Egch.
fant under the particular circumstances
93, note; Wharton v. Muckenzie, 5 Q.
in which he is placed: Reeves' Dom.
B. 606 ; Petersv. R,eming, 61. &W. 56 ;
Rel. *227. The preliminary question
s. o. Ewell's Lead Cas, 56, where the
above stated being determined, if the subject will be found further considered.
articles fall within the general class of
The rule as to what constitutes necessaries is believed to have been correctly
necessaries, then whether they were actually necessary and suitable to the con- stated in Peters v. 1lening, supra, though
doubtless in this country many would difdition and estate of the infant, and of
reasonable prices, must regularly be left fer from the court in its application to
to the jury as matter of fact: Bing. on
the facts of that case. In that case
PlAXE, B., laid down the rule thug:
Inf. 86, note 1, 87 ; Story on Sales, sect.
"All such articles as are purely orna35 ; Beeler v. Young, I Bibb 521 ; Bent
v. Manning, 10 Vt. 230 ; Grace v. Hall, mental and are not necessary are to be
2 Humph. 29 ; fMcKanna v. Merry, 61
rejected, because they cannot be requiIll. 178; Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N. C.
site for any one, and for such matters,
110; Nierriam v. Cunningham, I1 Cush.
therefore, an infant cannot be made re40; Stanton v. IVillson, 3 Day 57 ; Rysponsible. But, if they are not strictly
der v. Wombwell, L. R., 3 Exch. 90 ;
of this description, then the question
s. o., L. R., 4 Exch. 32. This proposiarises whether they were bought for the
tion is subject to the qualification that
necessary use of the party in order to
the question whether or not there is any
support himself properly in the degree,
evidence fairly tending to show that they
state and station of life in which lie
were actually necessary is for the court;
moved; if they were for such articles the
and if there is no such evidence, the case
infant may be responsible. 'That must be
may be withdrawn from the jury; but
a question for the jury, and it is for them
the weight of evidence, tf there is any,
to decide, upon due consideration,whether
is for the jury. The verdict is also subthe articles were of such a description or
ject to be set aside as being contrary to
not." See, also, notes to Petersv. Flemthe weight of the evidence. See Ryder
ing, Ewell's Lead. Cas. 68, where the
v. Wombwell, L. R., 4 Exch. 32. In
cases are fully collected.
this case the question as to what are not
MASTAL D. EWELL.
necessaries in law, and hence are to be
Chicago.
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United States Circuit Court. District of Kansas.
COBB v. PRELL.
When it is the intention of the parties to contracts for the sale of commodities that
there shall be no delivery thereof, but that the transactions shall be, adjusted and
settled by the payment of differences, such contracts are void.
It is the duty of the courts to scrutinize very closely contracts for future delivery,
and if the circumstnces are such as to throw doubt upon the question of the intention of the parties it is not too much to require a party claiming rights under such a
contract to show affirmatively that it was made with actual view to the delivery and
receipt of the commodity.
As the evidence in this case establishes the fact that the parties did not intend the
actual delivery of tue corn contracted for, but did intend to speculate upon the future
market and to settle the profit or loss of defendant upon the basis of the prices of grain
on the 3d of May 1881, as compared with the prices at which defendant contracted
to sell, thb contracts sued upon are void, and plaintiff cannot recover.
ACTION at law for

breach of contract.

-Everest & Waggener, for plaintiff.
J. B. Hfallowell and

. T. JcCleverty, for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
M CRARY , J.-In this case a jury was waived and the cause
was tried by the court. It is an action at law in which the plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract. The complaint alleges
that during the months of February, March and April, 1881, the
defendant, who is a grain dealer, residing at Columbus, Kansas,
authorized the plaintiff, who is a commission merchant at St. Louis,
Missouri, to sell for him certain quantities of corn to be delivered
to the party or parties to whom the plaintiff might sell the same, at
the option of defendant, during the month of May 1881. The
complaint further alleges that the plaintiff contracted for the sale
of said corn to be delivered during said month of May ; but that
defendant failing to deliver said corn, the plaintiff having contracted
to sell the same in his own name, was obliged to and did pay the
damages resulting from such failure, to wit: the difference between
the price of corn at the place of delivery on the 31st day of May
and the price at which defendant had agreed to sell and deliver the
same, amounting in the aggregate to $2945.25, for which, with
interest, he prays judgment.
The answer alleges that the contracts set out in the complaint
were option or marginal contracts, and that said plaintiff well knew
VOL. XXXI.-77
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them to be such, and so made the contracts of sale of said corn,
not expecting to receive of the defendant any portion of the
amounts of corn for delivery, but expecting to pay any losses or
receive any gains that might accrue for or against said defendant;
that said contracts were made for the purpose of*speciilating on
the rise and fall 6f prices, the plaintiff to receive commissions
for said transactions; and that said contracts were mere wagers on
the fluctuating of the prices of grain in the market of the city of
St. Louis.
The case therefore turns upon the question whether or not it
was the intention of the parties that the corn should be delivered.
If such was the bonafide intention, then the plaintiff is entitled to
recover ; but if, on the other hand, it was understood that the defendant was not required to deliver the corn, and that the transactions should be adjusted and settled by the payment of differences,
then the contracts were void and the plaintiff cannot recover.
Upon this controlling element in the case, as might reasonably be
expected, the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant is in conflict.
Under such circumstances we are obliged to determine the controversy by reference to the actions of the parties in connection with
the transactions and their contemporaneous declarations, especially
those in writing, having a bearing upon the subject. If we can
learn from these what interpretation the parties themselves have put
upon their own contract, we shall find a satisfactory guide in determining the case.
The evidence satisfactorily shows that the plaintiff was largely
engaged at and about the time of these transactions in dealing in
options. He was also largely engaged in buying and selling grain
for actual delivery. It appears that he adopted and had in use two
blank forms upon which statements of account were rendered to his
dealers, one of which was used when the grain was actually delivered, and the other when it was not delivered, and the settlement
was'made upon the basis of the differences. In the former statement, as might be expected, we find charges for freight, inspection,
insurance, weighing, storage and commissions. These are charges
which necessarily entered into the transaction where the grain was
shipped and delivered. In the latter statements these items do not
appear. They show only the number of bushels of grain bought,
the -price at which bought and the month of delivery; the price at
which the same was sold and the net loss or gain. There are in
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evidence thirty-four of these last-named bills, used in the settlement of option deals between June 26th 1881 and July 30th 1881,
all representing transactions between plaintiff and defendant. Of
the bills representing actual sales from the defendant to plaintiff
between September 18th 1880 and April 19th 1881, there are fiftyseven; so that it appears that the course of dealing between the
plaintiff and defendant was such that sometimes the grain contracted for was to be delivered, and at other times it was not to be
delivered, and the transactions were to be settled upon the basis of
margins. It only remains to be determined whether the transactions in controversy belong to the former or to the latter class.
If the question were to be determined upon the testimony of the
parties themselves, conflicting as it is, in connection with the
facts already stated, it would probably depend upon the question,
upon which party rests the burden of proof ? And I am inclined
to the opinion that, without reference to other evidence, the plaintiff would fail.
It is the duty of the courts to scrutinize very closely these time
contracts, and if the circumstances are such as to throw doubt upon
the question of the intention of the parties it is not too much to require a party claiming rights under such a contract to show affirmatively that it was made with actual view to delivery and receipt of the
grain: Barnardv. Backhaus, 9 N. W. Rep. 595.
It appearing that the parties were in the habit of dealing in
options, and the evidence being equally balanced upon the question
whether these were option contracts or not, the court would be
obliged, I think, to say that the plaintiff has failed to make out his
case by a preponderance of evidence. But whether this be so or
not, a reference to the written evidence, to be found in the correspondence of the parties at and near the time of the transaction,
strongly corroborates the defendant. A number of letters, written
about the time of these transactions, and evidently referring to them,
are in evidence, and an examination of them will show that the
plaintiff was constantly insisting, not upon the shipment of the
quantity of corP purchased by him, but upon the payment of margins, either in cash or by the shipment of enough corn to cover
margins. Februrary 11th plaintiff writes to defendant, referring
to the transactions between the parties as "option deals." April
22d, he writes, "We had to put up over $2000 on your deals,'"&c.
May 2d, he says, "You must ship us some corn as a margin."
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May 7th, he says, "If you can't ship us any corn to cover margins,
please send us $500." May 18th, he writes, "We draw $500 on
you. This is margins for your corn deals, which we hope you will
pay. This will leave you about $300 behind to make corn deals up
to market." May 27th, he says, "We have written you and drawn
on you for margins."
Perhaps the most significant letters bearing upon this questin 'are
those of May 30th and 81st, the dates on which the time for the
deliirery of the corn expired. If it was a bona fide transaction, and
plaintiff was expecting the delivery of the corn, we should expect to
hear him, in these letters, complaining or expressing surprise that the
time was about expired and the corn had not been delivered. But,
on the contrary, a reference to the letters of those dates will show
that the only complaint was that defendant had not furnished the
margins. Thus, on May 30th, plaintiff writes, "We cannot carry
these deals when you not only refuse to giverus margins, but seem to
pay no attention to our demands." On the 31st plaintiff writes to
explain the manner in which he had closed out the May corn, and
expressing regret at the serious loss to the defendant, but says nothing to indicate that he expected the corn to be shipped. Upon all of
the evidence, I am of the opinion, and therefore find the fact to be,
that the parties did not intend the actual delivery of the corn contracted for, but did intend to speculate upon the future market, and
to settle the profit or loss of the defendant upon the basis of the prices
of the grain on the thirty-first of May 1881, as compared with the
price at which defendant contracted to sell. Such being the fact,
the law is well settled that the plaintiff cannot recover: Helchert v.
Am. Un. Tel. Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 193; Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mich.
337; Pickering v. Cease, 79 Ill. 828; Barnard v. Backkaus,
supra.
Judgment for defendant.
There are perceptible differences beCo., U. S. Circuit Court, Kentucky,
tween regular trade and" speculation.
May 2d 1883. It is his means of make
These differences exist even though the ing a livelihood or acquiring a compespeculation be, as much- speculation al- tence. Education and experience familways is, entirely lawful and legitimate. iarizes him with the operation of the law
A regular trader is engaged in his busi- of supply and demand as to the commod
ness continuously. As remarked by ity he buys and sells. He knows, with
Judge BAnIRrecently, IIIt is the general more or less accuracy, its worth and
course of a man's business which defines marketability. The profit he expects is
and classifies it :" Bryant v. W. U. T. the difference between its retail and
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wholesale prices. Or it may be the difference between the price of the commodity, at the place where it is purchased,
and the price at the place to which it is
carried for market and sold.
On the other hand speculation, though
it may be followed as a regular business,
is oftener the taking advantage of opportunities to make money outside of one's
regular employment. It is frequently a
sort of commercial "bush-whacking."
The speculator buys lands, stocks, grain,
goods or any other property in expectation of a rise of price and of selling, so
as to profit by the advance. Or he sells
property for future delivery at an agreed
price, with the expectation of buying
enough of it io fill his contract at a lower
price before the time comes for him to
deliver. The latter is a most common
form of speculation, especially in stocks
and grain. A speculator comes to a
commission firm and orders them to purchase a quantity of grain or stock for
him; he does not pay for it, but simply
deposits with the commission firm as a
"marin" a proportion, say ten per
cent., of the cash value of the grain or
stock "bought" for him. The grain or
stock is then purchased and held by the
commission man, subject to the order'of
the speculator. If prices advance, he
orders a sale at the advance and pockets
the profits. If prices recede the "margin" stands as security to protect the
commission man if he is compelled to
sell at a loss. If prices go so low as to
absorb the entire "margin,"
more
" margins" are called for, and if the speculator fails to respond he is "closed
out," that is, the commission man sells
the grain or stocks at a loss and reimburses himself out of his customers'
"margin."
This business is simply
gambling--gambling of the same sort as
"three card monte" or "faro."
It is
more pernicious and demoralizing tlan
.either, for men and women will go upon
a "stock exchange," a "board of trade"
or into a "bucket shop," and put up

their" margins" or bets upon the rise or
fall of stocks or grain that would never
enter a "gambling hell" to bet upon the
turn of a card.
As to the forms of contracts for the
sale and future delivery of stocks, grain
and other securities or commodities: 1st,
they may be absolute in their terms; that
is, they may fix absolutely and positively
the amount of grain or whatever else is
sold, the price charged for it, and the
time at which it is to be delivered. This
is the ordinary and usual form of such a
contract. But the time within which delivery is to be made may be a period of
greater or less length. Usually a month
is the period stipulated for. The particular day of delivery is then optional with
the seller. The contract may be said to
be in one sense optional, meaning by this,
that it is optional with the seller upon
what day of the month named he will deliver. This is the kind of option that is
referred to by the phrases " seller the
month" or at " seller's option." ' These
terms mean that the seller has until the
last day of the month in which to make
delivery. The time of delivery may be
any time within the month, at the option
of the seller. Such an option as this is
mot illegal. It will not invalidate the
contract. It is not an option that the seller may deliver or pay the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time of delivery: Warren v.
Hewitt, 45 Ga. 501 ; -F'xleu v. Boynton,
79 Ill. 353.
A second form of contracts with reference to sale and future delivery is that
known as a "put."
The following is
an example of a "p u t" in common use
in New York:
"New York
18
"For value received, the bearers may
deliver me shares of the common
stock of the
Railroad Company
at per cent., at any time in days from date. The undersigned is
entitled to all dividends or extra dividends declared during the time
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"Expires

at It P.sr.
" Signed - -

The following is another form of a
'c put "
"Received of E. P. $50, in consideration of which we give him, or the holder
of this contract, the privilege of delivering to us or not, prior to 3 o'clock P.m.
of June 30th 1872, by notification or delivery, 10,000 bushels No. 2 oats, regular receipts at forty-one cents per
bushel, in store, and if delivered we
agree to receive and pay for the same at
the above price.
(Signed) CHAxeDLEi, Po EnoY & Co.
R. P. CHANDLER.
Clicago, June 1872."

ject of the sale.
thus :

A usual form of call is

NewYork, 1881.
"For value received, the bearer may
call on me for
shares of the common stock of the
Railroad
Company at per cent., any time in
days from date. The bearer is entitled to all dividends or extra dividends
declared during the time.
"Expires 1881, at it P.r.
Signed
"
The following is the form of contract
known as a "straddle" or "spread
eagle" :
" New York,
1881.
"For value received, the bearer may
call on the undersigned for shares
of the common stock of the
Railroad Company at per cent., any
time in days from date. Or the
bearer may, at his option, deliver the
same to the undersigned at -per
cent.,
any time within the period named. All
dividends or extra dividends declared
during the time are to go with the stock
in either case ; and this instrument is to
be surrendered upon the stock being
either called or delivered.
'Expires at I- P.3M.
"
" Signed

Tn re Chandler, 13 Am. Law. Reg.
N. S. 310.
A "put," it is obvious, is a mere privilege. It is not an agreement to sell and
deliver any property nor to purchase and
accept any. It is left entirely to the discretion of the owner of the privilege to deliver
or not to deliver at any time during the
period named. The signer agrees to take
the property at the price named if it is
tendered to him within the time specified.
Of course whether it will be tendered to
him or not depends upon the fluctuations
of the market. If the market price goes
below the price agreed upon in the priviSee Dos Passos on Stock Brokers 117,
lege then the owner of the privilege will
118.
buy at the lower market price and de"1The word" (straddle) says Judge
liver at the higher price agreed upon in
FiNcs, "if not elegant is at least exthe " put." His profit will be the differpressive. It means the double privilege
ence between the two prices. If, on the
of a ' put' and ' call,' and secures to the
other hand, the market price rises above
holder the right to demand of the seller
the price agreed upon in the privilege
at a certain price within a certain time a
then obviously the owner of the privilege certain number of shares of specified
to buy and "put" or deliver the comstock, or to require him to take at the
modity will not avail himself of it. He
same price within the same time the same
will prefer to lose the small consideration
shares of stock. The continuance of the
paid for the privilege rather than buy and
option is fixed by the agreement, and in
deliver the property at a greater loss.
this case was for sixty days. The value
The converse of a "put" is a "call"
of a ' straddle,' it is proven, depends
-the third form of contract relative to
upon the fluctuations of the stock sethe sale and future delivery of the sublected. The wider the range of these
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fluctuations, whether up or down, the
greater the amount which may be realized ; and of course the longer the option
continues the greater the chance of such
fluctuations during tile
period:" Harris
v. Tumbridge, 83 N. Y. 95.
Are these contracts legal ? It is true
that there have been some nice distinctions drawn concerning the right of a
person to sell personal property not at
the time owned by him, but which he intends to go into the market and buy"that which he bath neither actually nor
potentially," as it is said in some old
cases. But as remarked by the Supreme
Court of Michigan, "Courts must,
however, from necessity, recognise the
methods of conducting and carrying on
business at the present day, and applying
well-settled principles of the common law
enforce what might be called a new class
or kind of agreements heretofore unknown, unless they violate some rule of
public policy. The mercantile business
of the pFesent day could no longer be
successfully carried on, if merchants and
dealers were unable to purchase or sell
that which as to them had no actual or
potential existence. A dealer has a clear
right to sell and agree to deliver at some
future time that which he then has not,
but expects to go into the market and
buy. And it is equally clear that the
parties may mutually agree that there
need not be a present delivery of the
goods, but that such delivery may take
place at some other time ; and that there
need not be an actual manual possession
given, but a symbolical one, as by the
delivery of warehouse receipts according
to custom, is also beyond dispute:"
Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mich. 340. The
principles affirming the legality of sales
of property for future delivery are clearly
and well established: Wolcott v. Heath,
78 Ill. 437 ; Story v. Salomon, 71 N. Y.
420; Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 Id. 202;
Kir patrick v. Bonsall, 72 Penn. St. 158 ;
Storey v. Salowwn, 6 Daly 532 ; Brua's
Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 294 ; Grizewoodv.

Blane, 11 C. B. 540; Cassardv. Blinan,
I Bosw. 207 ; Brown v. Speyers, 20 G.-at.
309 ; Kingsbury v. Kirwan, 43 N. Y.
Superior Court 451 ; 6 Cent. Law -our.
228; Pickering v. Cease, 79 Ill. 330 ;
Barnardv.Back-haus, 52 Wis. 593; Por.
ter v. Viets, 1 Biss. 178 ; Stanton v.
Small, 3 Sandf. 230; Mcllhaine v. Egerton, 2 Robt. 422; Harris v. Tumbridge,
83 N. Y. 12 ; Logan v. Brown, 81 Ill.
419 ; Corbett v. Underwood, 83 Id. 327 ;
Tyler v. Barrows, 6 Robt. 104; Ribblewhite v. 3hcMorine, 5 M. & W. 466;
Mortimer v. .fcCallan, 6 Id. 58 ; Pixley
v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 353 ; Shales v. Seignoret, 1 Ld. Raym. 440.
But in order to be upheld by the courts
future delivery contracts must be made in
good faith. If they are merely fictitious,
if the parties have no intention of making
an actual sale and delivery of the article
dealt in, but intend to settle the contract
at its expirwion merely by paying the
difference between the contract and the
market prices, then it is a mere wager
upon expected fluctuations in prices, and
is illegal. All the cases concede and
many expressly decide this point. See
Porter v. Viets, I Biss. 177 ; Pixley v.
Boynton, 79 Ill. 353; Story v. Salomon,
6 Daly 531 ; Kirlpatrick v. Bonsall, 72
Penn. St. 158; Wolrott v. Heath, 78 I1.
437; Story v. Salomon, 71 N. Y. 420;
Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 Id. 202 ; Walls
v. Bailey, 49 Id. 472; Kingsbury v.
K'-wan, 43 N. Y. Superior Court 451
(1878) ; 6 Cent. Law Jour. 228 ; Barnard v. Backhaus, 52 Wis. 593; Rudolf
v. Winters, 7 Neb. 126; Norton v. Blinn,
Sup. Ct. of Ohio (1883) 9 Cin. Law
Bul. 263; Harrisv. Tumbridge, 8 Abb.
New. Cas. 291; s. c. 83 N.Y. 92;
Sampson v. Shaw, ,101 Mass. 150;
Rourke v. Short, 5 E. & B. 904: In re
Green, 15 Nat. B. Reg. 205 ; Hooker v.
Knab, 26 Wis. 511 ; Steers v. Lashley,
6 T. R. 61 ; Brua's Appeal, 55 Penn.
St. 296; Logan v. Brown, 81 Ill. 419;
Corbett v. Underwood, 83 Id. 327 ; Stanton v. Small, 3 Sand. 230; Tyler v. Bar-
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rows, 6 Robt. 104; Frost v. Clarkson, 7

the price at a given time, the case is

changed. The purpose then is not to deal
Cow. 24 ; Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mfich.
in the article but to stake upon the rise
337; Shales v. Seignoret, 1 Id. Raym.
or fall of its price. No money or capital
440; In re Chandler, 13 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 310; s. . Bex parte Young, 6 Biss. is invested in the purchase, but so much
53 ; Hibblewhite v. McjfQrine, 5 l. & only is required as will cover the differW. 466; Mortimer v. McCallum, 6 Id. ence-a margin, as it is figuratively
58; Warren v. Hewitt, 45 Ga. 508 ; termed. Then the bargain represents not
Grizewood v. Blane, 11 C.B. 540 ; Cas- a transfer of property but a mere stake
sard v. Hinman, 1 Bosw. 207; .Ruchizcy or wager upon its future price. The difv. DeHaven, 97 Penn. St. 202; Petrie ference requires the ownership of only a
v. Hanay, 3 T. It. 424; Ashton v. De- few hundreds or thousands of dollars,
kin, 4.H. & N. 867; Lehman v. Strass- while the capital to complete an actual
berger, 2 Woods 555 ; Durant v. Burt, purchase or sale may be hundreds of
98 Mass. 167 ; Owen v. Davis, 1 Bailey thousands or millions. Hence ventures
upon prices invite men of small means
315 ; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat.
274; Brown v. Speyers, 20 Grat. 309 ; to enter into transactions far beyond their
Yerices v. Salomon, 18 N. Y. Sup. C. capital, which they do not intend to fulfil,
and thus the apparent business in the
471 ; Pickering v. Cease, 79 Ill. 330;
particular trade is inflated and unreal,
Smith v. Thomas, 97 Penn. St. 279;
and like a bubble needs only to be pricked
Barnardv. Bacchaus, 52 Wis. 603.
The criterion is the intention of the to disappear, often carrying down the
parties. Do they intend an actual bona bona fide dealer in its collapse. Worse
fide sale or a mere wager ? If the for- even than this, it tempts men of large capital to make bargains of stupendous promer be intended the contract is legal ; if
the latter, it is illegal and void. This portions, and then to manipulate the
distinction is pointed out with great clear- market to produce the desired price.
ness and force by Mdr. Justice AGNEW This, in the language of gambling specof Pennsylvania, who says: "We must ulations, is making a corner, that is to
not confound gambling, whether it be in say the article is so engrossed or manipcorporation stocks or merchandise, with ulated as to make it scarce or plenty in
the market, at the will of the gamblers,
what is commonly termed speculation.
Mferchants speculate upon the future and then to place its price within their
prices of that in which they deal, and buy power. Such transactions are destrucand sell accordingly. In other words they tive of good morals and fair dealing and
think of and weigh, that is speculate the best interests of the community. If
upon, the probabilities of the coming the article be stocks, corporations are
market, and act upon this lookout into crushed and innocent stockholders are
the future in their business transactions ; ruined to enable the gambler in its price
and in this they.often exhibit high mental to accomplish his ends. If it be merdhandise, e.g. grain, the poor are robbed and
grasp and great knowledge of business,
misery engendered :" per AGNEW, J.,
Their
and of the affairs of the world.
in Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Penn. St.
speculations display talent and forecast,
155.
but they act upon their conclusions and
It being the intention of the parties
buy or sell in a bona fide way. Such
speculation cannot be denounced. But which characterizes the transaction (PbR-"
leyv. .Boynton, 79 IlI. 353), the all imwhen ventures are made upon the turn of
prices alone, with no bona fide intent to portant question is: How may the intendeal in the article, but merely 'to risk the tions of the contracting parties be kn6wn?
What are the evidences of their intendifference between the rise and fall of
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tions ? These are first, the contract itself. As a general rule a future delivery
contract will be l~resumed to have been
made in good faith. This is in accordance with the principle laid down by
Lord CoKE, "that whensoever the words
of a deed, or of the parties without deed,
may leave a double intendment, and the
one standeth with law and right, and the
other is wrongful and against law, the
intendment that standeth with the law
shall be taken :" Co. Litt. 42, 188. But
in Illinois "puts," "calls" and IIstraddles" have been made illegal and void by
statute : "Whoever contracts to have or
give to himself or another the option to
sell or buy at a future time any grain or
other commodity, stock of any railroad
or other company, or gold, or forestalls
the market by spreading false rumors to
influence the price of commodities therein, or corners the market or attempts to
do so in relation to any of such commodities, shall be fined not less than $10 nor
more thau $1000, or confined in the
county jail not exceeding one year, or
both; and all contracts made in violation
of this section shall be considered gambling contracts and shall be void: Rev.
Stat. fll. (Cothran's ad., 1880, p.
471), ch. 38, sect. 130. Under such a
statute, the contract itself is sufficient to
establish its illegality. See Pickeringv.
Cease, 79 Ill. 328.
Some judges, in the absence of such a
statute, have animadverted with great
severity upon "puts," seeming inclined
to hold them prima fade void. Judge
BLODGETT, speaking of the "Iput,"I In
re Chandler, supra, said: "It is in substance an assertion by the seller of the
' put' that oats cannot be purchased on
that market before 3 o'clock P.m., of the
forty-one
- 30th of June, for less than
cents a bushel, and an undertaking to
pay the difference between forty-one
cents and any market price. If he,
Chandler, sustains the price at forty-one
cents or above, he wins the half cent a
bushel paid for the 'put,' because the
VOL. XX-XI.78
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holder will not deliver, while if the price
goes below that named he is to pay the
difference. This is practically the contract. It is as manifestly a bet upon the
future price of grain as any which could
be made upon the speed of a horse or the
turn of a card."
"It is absurd," continues Judge
BLODGETT, " to suppose that they intended to deliver unless they could do so
for less than forty-one cents. They intended to deliver, if they could break
Chandler, or prevent his 'corner' from
culminating, as the jockey may intend
to walk his own horse over the course
after he has poisoned or lamed that of his
competitor." But in the absence of a
statute like that above, option contracts,
including ' puts,' 'calls' and 'straddles'
have generally been held not primafacie
illegal.
Even when there is such a statute a
contract which is optional only as to the
time of delivery is not illegal. The facts
that the contract allows an option, or
that it is a contract for the sale of gold,
grain, stocks or any securities or commodifies with which gambling transactions are notoriously frequent will not
establish illegality. Nor on the other
hand will the fact that the contract is
about a matter lawful in itself be conclusive as to its legality. As remarked by
Mr. Justice ThomPsoN in Brua's Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 298," That the transaction in this case assumed the form of a
contract about a matter lawful in itself
was not conclusive as to its real motive.
* * * That was the form which the
South Sea Bubble took in England, the
Tulip Speculation in Holland, and the
Morus 8 fulticaulis in this country ; and
the form served only as a thin covering
of the most frightful systems of gambling
ever known.
Other evidence as to the intentions of
the parties is their own testimony. But
may the parties themselves he called upon
to testify orally in regard to their intentions at the time of making the contract I
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Judge Dxum.boND decided that the defendant could not be permitted to show
by parol evidence that the intention of
both parties was that no grain should
actually be delivered, and that the difference should be settled between them in
cash: Porter v.Viets, 1 Biss. 177. He
based his decision upon the ground that
the admission of such evidence would
contravene the rule prohibiting the introduction of parol evidence to contradict,
alter or vary a written contract. But in
Cassardv. Hinman, 1 Bosw. 210; 6 Id.
13, it was decided that the admission of
extrinsic evidence as to the intention of
the parties'is not in violation of the rule
forbidding the introduction of parol evidence to contradict or vary the terms of
a written instrument. It was said that
this rule applies to the construction of
written agreements only as valid, subsisting contracts, and that a party may always show by parol that an instrument is
void because of fraud, want of consideration, or because it contravened some
statute, rule of the common law or of
public policy. And in Yerkes v. Salo-men, 18 N. Y. Sup. 0. 473, it is decided that a plaintiff in a suit upon an
option contract may be asked, "Was it
your intention at the time those contracts
or either of them were made to tender or
call for the stock, or merely to settle upon
the difference ?" The court said that the
form of the contract did not decide this
question, because it would not be difficult
to make a contract relating to a bet "apparently lawful while the intent with
which it was entered into was to avoid
or evade the statute as to gaming.
The age and financial ability of the
parties to the contract are facts which
,have an important bearing upon the question of intention. In Pennsylvania,
where a minor of limited means embarks in stock transactions to a large
amount by way of margins, the court
will, even in the absence of direct evidence that he did not intend to receive or

deliver the stock bought or sold on his
behalf, infer that such was not his intent,
and will therefore stamp his contracts as
wagering contracts contrary to law and
void ab initio: .Ruchigz v. DeHaven, 97
Penn. St. 202.
It may be shown too that the person
claiming under the contract was not a
dealer in the commodity bought, that he
had no contracts for such commodity to
fill, that he did not intend to call for it,
if the market price receded below that
fixed in the agreement, that he made
many other contracts to buy for such commodity, more in fact than he was financially able to pgy for: Kirkpatrick v.
Bonsall, 72 Penn. St. 155. In Re Chandler, 13 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 310, the
proof of a "corner" consisted of evidence that notwithstanding there was but
2,700,000 bushels of oats in store in Msay
and but 800,000 bushels arrived in June,
Chandler purchased in that time 2,500,000 bushels of cash oats and June "options" to the amount of 2,939,400 bushels. He advanced the price from thirtynine to forty-one cents per bushel,
notwithstanding the price declined in
New York and other markets. So that
oats to ship from Chicago were not worth
over thirty-three or thirty-five centsand July options in Chicago were not
worth over thirty-six cents in Chicagoand immediately after Chandler's failure
prices declined from forty-one to thirty
cents and even to twenty-six cents per
bushel. The sellers of options and holders of "puts" got resolutions through
the Board of Trade making new warehouses where oats had never been stored
before "regular" for the performance of
the contracts. Facts like these may be
shown to prove that the contracts and
transactions under investigation are fictitious and not genuine sales and deliveries.
In the principal case the intention of
the parties is very clearly shown by means
of their correspondence and accounts
rendered. -Pamphlets or circulars issued

